The Egyptian government has survived the first crisis of the revolution and both the government and the protesters are moving to a new trial of strength. Surviving the first blast of popular fury — and of international criticism — is an important milestone for the government. The longer it can hold out, the more likely it is that the core power centers of the Egyptian regime — the ‘deep state’ as the Turks say — will survive the Mubarak era and dominate the country for some time to come.
I am not sure what to wish for. The current Egyptian system in many ways has overstayed its welcome and the economic, political and social development of the country has been seriously affected. Revolutions, though, however thoroughly justified, have their drawbacks. Both the major revolutions of the English speaking world, the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the American Revolution of 1776, ended unusually well. Those revolutions, however, were the exception that proves the rule. The outcome of other revolutions has been less unambiguously good.
The French Revolution, for example, quickly degenerated into the Reign of Terror and culminated in the military dictatorship of the “Emperor” Napoleon and a generation of brutal war. The liberals of the February Revolution in Russia lost out to the mindlessly bloody and destructive Bolsheviks ten months later, and Russia plunged into an unspeakable civil war and the genocidal horrors of Leninist/Stalinist rule. China’s revolutionary communists killed scores of millions of people through their grotesque mixture of brutality, fanaticism and incompetence. The clergy of Iran turned on their allies, leading the country into the horrifying and pointless war with Iraq and establishing a regime worse than anything the Shah could have dreamed of.
I do not know what will happen in Egypt; no one does. Most revolutions do not go on to the radical stage; they fail at an earlier era. If the forces of order withstand the first dramatic assaults, they are often well positioned to grind their enemies down. The Revolution of 1848 failed almost everywhere in Europe — except in France when it brought in another dictatorship and another Napoleon.
Tahrir Square, downtown Cairo – February 2, 2011 (twitpic/AJE Live)
But whether the Egyptian Revolution succeeds or fails, it does not seem headed for 1688 or 1776. The liberal and enlightened forces in Egypt, real and inspiring though they are (and I’ve met many wonderful Egyptians), are too weak and too inexperienced to have much chance of holding onto power when and if the government crumbles away. Egypt’s problems are too daunting, its militants too strong and too well organized, its civil society is too deeply divided between Islamists and liberals, and its civic and religious life has been too deeply wounded to make the emergence of moderate, forward-looking and constructive governance look likely right now. There is nothing wrong with hoping that something better may come — and I do — but hope is not a plan.
It is generally difficult in revolutionary situations to interpret events clearly. Through the smoke and noise, it appears at this point that while the personal power of President Mubarak has eroded, the heart of the military power structure in the country is still intact. President Mubarak appears to be negotiating for a dignified exit (perhaps including some financial and legal guarantees) while all around him the Egyptian power structures are trying to ensure their own survival at a chaotic time.
At the moment there is a standoff. Mubarak didn’t flee in a helicopter, the junior officers and the troops have so far remained loyal to the generals, and the police retreated but they have not disappeared. The television and radio stations are firmly in government hands; the streets belong to the revolution.
On balance, the US administration has probably helped the government, and Washington’s intervention in the crisis is not (yet) turning out very well. Public pressure on President Mubarak to step down has allowed the Egyptian authorities to wrap themselves in the national flag. “Let’s find an Egyptian solution to Egypt’s problems,” they can say. “President Mubarak will not be running for re-election; do not let the Americans dictate our timetable for change.” Many in the Egyptian army who normally might have wanted to shed Mubarak quickly will now want to let him hang on through the fall to spite Obama if for no other reason. At the same time, foreign pressure gave the government an opening to crack down on foreign (and domestic) journalists, helping to deprive the revolution of the attention and television coverage vital to keeping public excitement and mobilization alive.
In revolution, momentum matters. In a poor country like Egypt, mass demonstrations cannot continue indefinitely. The middle class can stay in the streets, but the poorer people need to feed their families. A few days’ pay is all that stands between many families in Egypt and hunger. Beyond that, the kind of excitement that gives people the courage to defy authorities and risk death depends on an emotional surge that tends to fade as time drags on.
The Egyptian authorities needed to stall for time and slow down the clock. That they seem to have done; if they can hold the line, the regime (though not the Mubarak family) has a reasonable prospect of riding out the storm or of forcing a longer term stalemate.
Stalled revolutions often produce temporary, halfway regimes in which elements of the old power structure and leaders of the popular protest movements — neither strong enough to rule without the other — try to govern together. Both still hope to gain (or hold on to) total control, so they are rivals as much as they are partners in government. These arrangements are extremely unstable; hard-liners in both camps are waiting for the opportunity to destroy their opponents and gain exclusive power.
There is no iron law about how this process works out. Sometimes the old regime recovers; the unrest gradually dies down, the army stays loyal and the day comes when the pre-revolutionary regime (often the same forces with a new leader) reasserts itself. This happened over much of Europe when the revolutions of 1848 fizzled out. It happened again after World War One when communist attempts to seize power in countries like Germany and Hungary led to the return of conservative rule.
Sometimes the revolutionary momentum continues and ultimately the moderate and liberal elements of a coalition government lose power to the hard line revolutionary forces. This is what happened when the October Revolution in Russia threw out the liberals and moderates and put the Bolsheviks in charge. It is what happened in Cuba and Iran. It happened in France when the moderates (like Lafayette) were defeated by the Jacobins and the Reign of Terror got underway.
In these situations, Americans almost always want the moderates to win. Those are usually the people whose values are closest to our own, and with whom we can likely do business. Unfortunately, moderates are usually too weak, too disorganized and frequently too idealistic to hold on to power in chaotic and violent times. The hard liners — people on the ‘right’ like the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran or like Lenin and his colleagues on the left — are often much tougher, more focused and can bring more effective forces into the field than the liberal social reformers like the Marquis de Lafayette.
Protest sign in Cairo (Twitpic/elihuh2001)
For many years now, there has been a quiet tug of war between the United States and the Mubarak government. Americans wanted Mubarak to nurture and support moderate and liberal-minded leaders and groups so that when this moment of crisis finally and inevitably came, the moderate forces would be well equipped to offer the country constructive leadership. The Egyptian government generally resisted; it felt that as long as the choice seemed to be Mubarak or the Muslim Brotherhood, the US would continue to back the government, however unhappy we were with it. Despite that refusal, the US (and many European countries who have also engaged with Egyptian civil society) continued to do everything it could to encourage the rise of a liberal and modernizing movement in Egypt. We are about to find out how successful this was.
One reason that revolutions fail is that the middle classes can ultimately become more frightened of the lower classes and of continued disorder than they are of the government. This could happen in Egypt; small business needs order and municipal services. Many of the liberal, secular Egyptians leading some of the early demonstrations could be spooked by signs of Iranian style Islamic militancy — or any kind of forcible redistribution of property and mob violence.
The Egyptian army has been the most important political force in the country since Egypt’s last big revolution drove out the odious King Farouk in 1952. During all that time the army has seen the Muslim Brotherhood as a rival and an enemy. Will these two ancient enemies now kiss and make up? Will they enter a marriage of convenience in which each partner seeks to slip poison into the partner’s food? Will either the army or the Brotherhood so dominate the street that one takes power alone? Or, if power between them seems fairly equally balanced, will they vie for the support of Egypt’s small but wealthy and influential group of liberals — not to mention the country’s significant Christian minority, the Copts?
We can be sure that these scenarios and others are whirling in the minds of the leaders of Egypt’s political forces right now. Nobody knows how it will all work out. It could be hours, weeks or even months before we have a clear sense of Egypt’s new direction. One more push from the demonstrators could break the military’s will to resist — or the wave could crest and the fever break.
An important factor in Egypt’s future will be the degree to which the country depends on a strong relationship with the outside world. Egypt is not a major oil producer and its 85 million people need more than the waters of the Nile to live the good life. Revenues from the Suez Canal, tourism and a continuing flow of foreign investment are all essential if Egypt’s economy is to provide hope for its people. Egypt’s military does not want and cannot afford a major arms race with Israel — nor could any new Egyptian government manage the consequences of yet another war. Egypt is no Libya, Iran or Venezuela: it cannot afford the kind of irresponsible foreign policy those countries indulge in — though no doubt there are some Egyptians who would like to give it a try.
The only thing in all this I am certain of is that the Egyptian Revolution, however it ends, will not be the only revolution in the 21st century. We live in a revolutionary world and governments in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, parts of Europe and Latin America are out of touch with public opinion and overwhelmed by economic and social forces that they cannot manage. Many heads of state and many army staffs are likely to go through what President Mubarak and the Egyptian military are going through this week.
There is no magic stability potion that can make these troubles go away. The accelerating technological revolution irresistibly sweeping back and forth across planet Earth places stresses on many countries and many political systems that they are simply unable to bear. It is Egypt’s turn this week; expect many more dramas like the one playing out in the streets of Cairo as the years and decades of our exhilarating and terrifying new century go by.
Excellent historical perspective and analysis. I’m somewhat pessimistic. Here’s what I wrote two days ago:
It is said that a second marriage is the triumph of hope over experience. Right now, the optimism that I hear from the administration and the MSM in the midst of a very fluid situation sounds very much like the hope for the second marriage.
The problem with the optimism that many are expressing for the revolutions in the Middle East is that, while there are many examples of happy marriages, there are no examples of democratic Islamist regimes. The Middle East was substantially converted to Islam following the dictates and example of Muhammad who’se rule and religion was spread by the sword. This situation has not changed substantially since Mohammad’s death in 632. Before Mohammad the region was ruled by Romans, king and Pharaohs; after him it was ruled by Caliphs. There is no – zero – example of Democracy in the Middle East with the exception of Israel and a very shaky state – Iraq – which was created, nurtured and shaped by the American military following the invasion under George Bush. To repeat, there is no history or political culture of representative government in the Middle East.
The one unifying factor in the region is Islam, a religion that demands submission to its political and theological dictates on pain of death. Not since Henry the Eight created the English church and became its political head have rulers held such secular and religious power.
It is said that in every human breast there is the desire to be free. Perhaps, but it’s also true that in many human breasts is the desire to force others to our will. To believe what we believe and agree with our ideas. In the dominant culture in America that wish is expressed in the demand that Glenn Beck should be fired, that Rush Limbaugh should be banned and Sarah Palin should shut up. In many Islamic countries it’s expressed in beheading, hanging or stoning.
The Egyptian people have been misruled by Mubarak for decades. But he’s not the first or the worst. The people in the Middle East have been misruled for centuries. If the levelers in America were truly concerned about wealth discrepancies, they would slink away from criticizing American wealth disparities and focus on the truly incredible differences between the rich and the poor in Africa and the Middle East.
With no history of democracy and a culture and religion that disdains individual freedom, the concept that democracy will spring from the revolutions that are now engulfing the region is unrealistic. Remember what we were told about the revolution in China: that Mao was an agrarian reformer. Castro was sold as a freedom fighter. We helped overthrow the Shah to usher in a repressive theocracy despite a population that favors Western values.
And, God help us, we have a President who really doesn’t like the America he was elected to lead.
I would like to be wrong, but Democracy is a rare flower; repression and authoritarianism is the global rule not the exception. Hoping and wishing that the people of Egypt will throw off the yoke of literally millennia of repression – all by themselves – and usher in the rule of law and a representative government is as believable as the Easter Bunny.
I pray I’m wrong, and would love to have to eat my words in a year. But the odds are loaded heavily in my favor. The problem is, if I’m right, we lose and so do the poor people of the Middle East.
Coalition regimes have a history of being just a halfway mark on the route to oppression, by design: Remember Stalin’s Comintern, Ho’s Viet Minh, Ortega’s Sandinistas? A post at http://www.granitesentry.com.
The “Glorious” Revolution and the American Revolution were revolutions in name only. 1688 wasn’t exactly one of the wilder years in 17th century England. The Puritan Revolution was much more so.
The rebellion in the United States was a reaction to Britain’s attempt to change the status quo. What was revolutionary is the establishment of a republic that survived.
@ Mike: They were revolutions only in name if we accept that Revolutions like the French Revolution are the real thing and that ours are just pale imitations. 1688 and 1776 did what revolutions do: introduce rapid change that is also long lasting — but they did it without all the muss and fuss of other revolutions.
As I watch events unfold in Egypt I keep flashing back to V.S. Naipaul’s account of the 79 Iranian revolution which gives a heart rendering account of the naivete of the democratic reformers and their betrayal by the Islamists. Nonetheless I am getting more optimistic because it looks like the regime may hang on, sans Mubarak, and that there is a chance of reform rather than the chaos which I think would inevitably be subverted by the Muslim Brotherhood with Bolshevik efficiency.
On a very different tack I would just point out that the simple minded support of the protesters as a force for good by the media is, apart form ideology, a function of the nature of television news. It is drama derived from the cinema which is derived from the theater which stretches back to Ancient Greece and beyond. Its function is to grip us emotionally and persuade us, not inform us. It needs good guys and bad guys. Mubarak (BOO HISS) Handsome Egyptian Protester (Cheer cheer). An Egyptian Lafayette? Too complex, too boring for a staring role.
This is some of the best reading available on the subject. Thanks.
Excellent historical perspective here. One big problem though is that the Obama administration is seriously flirting with the idea of opening a “dialogue” with the Muslim Brotherhood, i.e. the radicals, because very loud voices are insisting that this group has “moderated” and “renounced violence.” If it comes to power there will be a lot of blood on the administration’s hands.
I sometimes wonder why the major industrial democracies don’t get together and use their economic and financial muscle to incentivize certain minimal standards of civilization in the less-developed countries of the world. Right now, for example, WTO rules (tariff structures, access to financial institutions, travel) are fixed with little reference to the behavior of the regimes who are party to it. Sanctions, when they exist, are haphazard and post facto.
We live in a unique historical moment, one in which the richest and most powerful countries in the world have the economic might to enforce such norms. It won’t last.
I’d love to see Mead at least address this possibility — the diplomatic hurdles in particular.
Mr. Mead, you hit the old nail square on the head when you closed with:
“There is no magic stability potion that can make these troubles go away. The accelerating technological revolution irresistibly sweeping back and forth across planet Earth places stresses on many countries and many political systems that they are simply unable to bear.”
Americans had more rights before the revolution than people living in dictatorships in the Middle East and Central Asia. Americans living in colonies were asking same rights in taxation and more representation enjoyed by Englishmen in the UK. Otherwise, Americans had already self-government representatives in each colony. 13th century Magna Carta and English Common Law had already foundation to build civil society. French, Russian and Iranian revolutions failed to create open society due to non-existence of a framework of civil society norms. When I was taking international business course at the college, I was told that you have to know traditional way of doing business in every culture. For example, when you do business in Arab countries, you have to give ‘bakshish’, which means you have to bribe somebody to do your business. While our government has adopted Foreign Corrupt Practices act in 1977, corruption and bribery had never been transparent in those countries. Last year, our government paid 1.5 billion dollars federal aid to Egypt. Even some of that money were used to buy US merchandise, the rest was used for internal affairs like strengthening security forces used to persecute opposition. Under corrupt practices act, our government actually bribed Mubarak’s government to buy ‘stability’ and ‘peace’ in the region. Lack of democracy and its values have nothing to with Islam. The Western democracies had its share of dictators in 20th century – Mussolini, Hitler, Franko. There is still Lukashenko in Belarus and Russian authoritarian regime with Putin in command. At the same time, we have Muslim countries with democratic values at various levels – Turkey, Malaysia, Indonesia, UAE, emerging Kyrgyzstan, evolving Pakistan. If there is social vacuum in any society with no alternatives, it always is filled with radical extremes (religious, socialistic, nationalistic, etc).
An educational post. Very informative. I always enjoy reading your material. Thnx
Just doing a little Meadian analysis:
1)Jacksonians- power to the people side with the rebels
2)Wilsonians- let’s teach them democracy-side with the rebels
3)Hamiltonians- let’s keep the Suez canal open-sides with the regime
4)Realists- lets maintain middle east security-sides with the regime
5)Jeffersonians- Let’s avoid entanglement-stay the heck out of it.
If there are any Jeffersonians left, they may have the most sensible approach.
Globalization and its global reallocation of labor has lessened the political and economic power of the people with jobs in developed countries in favor of outright unemployment or reduced wages due to job competition.
Egypt could take advantage of this phenomenon through better technical education, friendly attitudes toward Western countries (the importers of its products and services), and a softer approach to its main religion that stresses spiritualism over the practicalities and national enrichment in a secular world.
Egypt’s military and present political leaders must understand all that and must be willing to make necessary social and economic changes to make Egypt a better economic player on the world scene, like China and India are today. The nation’s young people, who are the predominate demographic number, will insist on that for their own benefit.
Any new power center arising from the recent demonstrations and bending of the government will have to make a contract with the young people regarding their economic well-being in the near future. An overly Islamic power center, without foreign economic ties and oil derived money, will not be able to that. It will be a moderate and somewhat democratic power center that will be see the advantage of economic ties to the West, and indeed to Israel, that we will see coming out from this endeavor for change.
Any way you look at this situation, Mr. Mead is absolutely correct. This is going to be “a terrifying new century…”
Historian, John Lukacs, never a sunbeam of hope, once wrote that we are facing 200 years of chaos.I wonder if populist mass movements will be the new norm, this time armed with WMD’s instead of pitchforks.
Mike: The “Glorious” Revolution and the American Revolution were revolutions in name only….
WTM: They were revolutions only in name if we accept that Revolutions like the French Revolution are the real thing and that ours are just pale imitations. 1688 and 1776 did what revolutions do: introduce rapid change that is also long lasting — but they did it without all the muss and fuss of other revolutions.
It seems to me that the distinctive difference between the “sustainable” revolutions of England and America and the “unsustainable” ones of everywhere else is that, in the former, the local structures of governing were left largely intact. They were political revolutions, but not really social revolutions. Although I suppose you could say that (especially) the American Revolution started a social revolution which is still playing out….
” The clergy of Iran turned on their allies, leading the country into the horrifying and pointless war with Iraq and establishing a regime worse than anything the Shah could have dreamed of.”
What do you mean “…leading the country into the .. war with Iraq…”? Iraq started the war by invading Iran.