October 24, 2012

Two Anniversaries

Two periodicals that I read regularly have just published special anniversary issues. National Catholic Reporter has come out with a special issue to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the opening of the Second Vatican Council. Der Spiegel, the German news magazine, has a special issue devoted to another fiftieth anniversary, that one of a series of events culminating in the arrest of its then editor, Rudolf Augstein, on a charge of treason. The two topics seem quite unrelated. Readers of this blog will have discovered my idiosyncratic tendency to see connections where other people don’t. Here is another case in point.

Most everyone agrees that Vatican II, which met from 1962 to 1965, was an important event affecting the internal workings of the Roman Catholic Church and its relation to the outside world. Catholic progressives and conservatives have different assessments. Many in the former group think that the Council did not go far enough in meeting the challenges of the present age (the adaptation called aggiornamento), and that since then the Papacy has pulled back from what were then hailed as reforms. Conversely, many conservatives feel that the Council went too far in its accommodations, and that Rome should rein in the reformers even more than it has. Both groups, as well as Catholics in the middle and non-Catholic observers, agree that what happened was important. In document after document the Council formulated new approaches to a long list of topics, from liturgy (the text of the Mass changed from Latin to the diversity of vernacular languages) to ecumenicity (the Church entering into respectful dialogue with non-Catholics of every description). If one adds these up, they amount to a formidable change of direction in the Church’s attitude toward modernity, which had previously been resisted with stubborn determination. This resistance reached a certain high point when Pope Pius IX convoked the First Vatican Council in 1869 which, in defiance of modernity, solemnly proclaimed the doctrines of Papal Infallibility and of the Immaculate Conception of Mary. At the onset of Vatican II a Protestant theologian was asked what he expected to happen; he replied: “They will not ask for the minutes of the last meeting.” They certainly did not.

Two documents of Vatican II had very important consequences for the role of the Church in the wider world. Dignitatis Humanae (“Human Dignity”) endorsed human rights as they had been understood since the Enlightenment (though of course that derivation was not explicitly acknowledged), including (most important) freedom of religion. What is more, these rights were theologically legitimated as rooted in the divinely created dignity of man, as indicated in the title of the document.  Gaudium et Spes (“Joy and Hope”), promulgated on the day the Council ended, redefined the attitude of the Church toward the political order. While the word “democracy” was not used, the document rejected all forms of dictatorial rule and affirmed the freedom of people to choose their type of government. The Church never admits openly that any significant changes have occurred; it always pretends that each change is simply a richer amplification of earlier positions. But the political contexts of the two Councils make the degree of change very clear. Vatican I met while the troops engaged in unifying Italy, a project of modern nation-building, occupied Rome, ended the sovereignty of the Papal States, and had Pope Pius IX announce that he was a prisoner in the Vatican. Contrast this with the address of Pope Paul VI before the General Assembly of the United Nations, where he solemnly affirmed, to general applause, the positions of Dignitatis Humanae. Since then the Catholic Church has been a major factor in democratization and the advocacy of human rights, with dramatic effects in eastern Europe, Latin America and the Philippines.

There is a monument in Rome to the Bersaglieri, the Italian elite troops that occupied the Eternal City. The monument consists of a soldier of this elite force, with his distinctive plumed hat, shown running in an assault. (The Bersaglieri never march, always run, even in parade.) It was once pointed out to me that this figure is positioned so as to face away from the Vatican, his behind pointing at it (in a sort of ideological “full monty”).  One might say that at the United Nations this figure of militant modernity turned around and saluted (at least for a moment – Paul VI did not give a lecture on, say, Catholic sexual ethics).

The so-called Spiegel affair also began in 1962, when the magazine published leaked information about discussions within the defense ministry of the Federal Republic, whose military was then only a few years old and had now been integrated into NATO. The affair coincided with the Cuban missile crisis, when the United States and the Soviet Union came closer to nuclear war than ever before. The Spiegel story told of a secret NATO war game, which was based on a scenario of atomic war in central Europe that would cost fifteen million lives in western Germany. Franz-Joseph Strauss, the defense minister in the Bonn government, was reported to have called the new military as “being of limited defense capability” (“Bedingt abwehrbereit”, the title of the story) and to have concluded that only atomic weapons could stop a Soviet invasion. Rudolf Augstein believed that NATO should build up its conventional military in order to avoid the catastrophic consequences of nuclear war. Thus the issue was of existential importance for Germany, which justified the publication of secret government papers (a rough American parallel is the famous publication of the “Pentagon Papers”). Strauss was enraged. He commissioned an analysis of the Spiegel story which concluded that the latter was guilty of betraying forty-one state secrets. What followed were formal charges of treason. The police raided the offices of the magazine, confiscating materials. Augstein and others on the editorial staff were arrested; Augstein remained in prison for one hundred and three days. In some way the affair was a personal duel between Strauss and Augstein. The Federal Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, backed his defense minister, calling the magazine “an abyss of treason” (“ein Abgrund des Landesverrat”). If it was a duel, Augstein clearly won. By early 1963 all charges were dropped. On the contrary Strauss was accused of abuse of authority; no charges were pressed against him either.

As with Vatican II, German progressives and conservatives have had different assessments of this episode. The former group saw it as a battle for freedom of the press against a government with authoritarian tendencies, supposedly embodied in Franz-Joseph Strauss. Augstein was widely seen as a hero of democracy and freedom of speech (incidentally, he was never a man of the Left, rather a liberal in the European sense of the term). Conservatives have been less admiring. The Spiegel special issue, not surprisingly, shares the heroic perspective. In a regular issue of the magazine, the affair is described as “when the Germans learned to love their democracy”. This probably exaggerates the importance of the episode. But it certainly shows that democracy had by then been robustly institutionalized in western Germany, both in law and in the culture. The Federal Republic was more Catholic before the unification with largely Protestant east Germany. Catholic influences were strong, especially but not only in the camp of Christian Democracy. Thus the synchronicity of the democratization of Germany and the shift in Rome’s attitude to democracy is not coincidental. Short of truly cataclysmic events it is hard to imagine that either could be reversed.

In recent years there has been a widespread debate in Europe, mainly triggered by the increasing presence of Islam, as to what are its core values. Democracy and human rights, including especially freedom of religion and freedom of speech, have been prominent in the debate over “European values”. Rabbi Hillel the Elder, who died in year 10 of the Common Era, was famously asked whether one could state the meaning of Torah while standing on one leg. He replied yes, then formulated the first version of the Golden Rule, “That which is hateful to you, do not do to another”. (Jesus quoted Hillel, as recorded in Mathew 7 and Luke 6 – but there are no footnotes in the New Testament.) Hillel added: “This is the whole Torah. The rest is commentary”.  A couple of years ago I participated in a conference in Berlin on the question of “European values” – which of course are no longer just European, but are global values of liberal democracy. I referred to the Hillel anecdote, then suggested that one could also state the meaning of “European values” while standing on one leg. One could simply quote the first sentence of Article 1 of the constitution of the Federal Republic: “The dignity of man is inviolable” (“Die Wuerde des Menschen ist unantastbar”). The rest indeed is commentary, but this is what it is all about.

It is possible to have the electoral mechanisms of democracy without these core values. Democratically elected governments can be lynch mobs. There is a very important difference between democratism, definable as a blind faith in the machinery of elections, and liberal democracy, animated by the aforementioned values and equipped with institutions to protect them. It is also important to understand that these values are not just theoretical propositions, but the result of lived experience. Of course there are elaborate theories about the values of liberal democracy. But these theories are grounded in actual human experience, including the experience of people who are not theorists (the great majority) and perhaps have never read a book. At the core of this experience is a perception of man as, precisely, the bearer of an inviolable dignity. Put differently, anthropology precedes ethics.

One of my favorite examples of this is from American literature, in Mark Twain’s Huckleberry Finn: Huck is sailing on the Mississippi when an escaped slave climbs aboard his raft. Huck is a child of the Old South, socialized in its ethics, which tells him that he ought to return the slave to his rightful owner. He cannot bring himself to do this. Why? Huck has not been the target of abolitionist propaganda, has not read Uncle Tom’s Cabin let alone any philosophical treatise on the rights of man. Rather, he suddenly perceives his passenger as a human being with intrinsic dignity and the right to be free. This is what in classical Greek drama was called an anagnorisis, a “recognition scene”. This is not a theory, but an experience. It can be mediated by theory and legitimated by theory after the fact. But the experience is primal.

Where does it come from?  Christians tend to think that it comes from the Judaeo-Christian tradition and that it cannot be divorced from it. The first notion is partially correct, the second is false. Yes, that religious tradition has been one of its sources in the history of European civilization, though not the only one. There was also Greek politics and philosophy, Roman law and, most directly, the semi- or post-Christian sensibility and thought of the Enlightenment. There are some parallels of this in south- and east-Asian civilizations, certainly also in Islam. But it is only in Europe that the idea and the experience of the intrinsic dignity of every human individual was first codified in law and in political institutions. The legitimations are important, thus the endorsement of liberal democracy by the Roman Catholic Church has had empirically real consequences. But, whatever its history, the discovery of intrinsic human dignity is not limited to Europe or its geographical extensions. It is now universally available. It was thus available, even in a rudimentary articulation, to the students who put up a replica of the Statue of Liberty in the center of Beijing and to the Tunisian street peddler who immolated himself because he felt that his dignity had been violated. Agnostics and atheists are clearly capable of the same perception.

I think that we experience the aforementioned anagnorisis most powerfully when we are confronted by gross violations of human dignity. Both in the case of Dignitatis Humanae and of the first article of the German constitution there is the shadow of the unspeakable violations of human dignity by the Nazis. I doubt if either case would have occurred, then and in this form, had it not been for the memory of those horrors. The institutions of liberal democracy are the best bet that such horrors will not recur.

Posted in Catholicism, Freedom, Modernity, Morality
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  • Wayne Lusvardi

    Dr. Berger’s juxtaposing of the Catholic Dignitatus Humanae declaration and the coincident event of a German journalist exposing his government’s policy of considering 15 million West Germans expendable should nuclear warfare with Russia breakout is historically ironic.

    Circa 70 C.E. Roman Emperor Titus Flavius demolished the Jewish Temple in Jerusalem and forced the Maccabean zealots to mass suicide at Masada, if historian Josephus is to be believed. Arguably, Titus may have commissioned Jewish-Roman historian Josephus (and Titus’ mistress Bernice and Secretary of State Alexander) to write the Christian Gospels to create a new spiritual, pacifistic and tax paying religion to replace militant Judaism.

    This tends to prove Dr. Berger’s point that the “dignification” of man (and women) was once divorced from the Christian church: the notion of unassailable human dignity wasn’t a prominent part of Catholic Christianity during the Crusades or the Inquisition.

    I believe it was sociologist Malcolm Hamilton who pointed out in his book “Sociology and the World’s Religions” that the Catholic Church is the institutional legacy of the Roman Empire. Whether the Romans conspired to invent Christianity or not, it is ironic that Catholicism should end up the institutional carrier of liberal democracy in Europe. Sociologist-historian Max Weber might say history is accidental. Others might say even providential.

  • Gary Novak

    Berger asks where Huck’s recognition of Jim’s inviolable humanity comes from. He says Christians would attribute it to the Judeo-Christian tradition but that it has other origins, too, and can, therefore, be divorced from Christianity (although he would agree that true Christianity cannot be divorced from it). Atheists are quite capable of recognizing inviolable human dignity. But if we view Huck’s anagnorisis as a signal of transcendence, then we would say that the experience comes not from the tradition of the visible church but from God. The experience does not presuppose familiarity with any religious tradition—God is no respecter of religious credentials and speaks to theists and atheists alike. Berger has argued in a number of places that religious traditions are two-edged swords: they perpetuate the kerygma—and they domesticate and corrupt it. So membership in a church is not necessarily an advantage in getting close to God or being moral.

    But if Huck’s anagnorisis does not presuppose “deductive” religion, is it not the starting point of “inductive” religion? Huck’s experience is not a consequence of religion but is the origin of religion. So when we say that anthropology precedes ethics, we must be careful not to imply that morality is autonomous—independent of religion, coming and going. If atheists and agnostics are to take morality seriously, their anthropology, like the “primordial human gestures” discussed by Berger in “Rumor of Angels,” must have an “intrinsic intention [which] points beyond itself and beyond man’s ‘nature’ to a ‘supernatural’ justification’” (p. 60). It is not necessary that the intention be made explicit—again, explicitness can lead to doctrine, routinization of charisma, and corruption—religion may be most vital (but also most precarious)when it is inchoate, uncodified, and undomesticated. But if we uncouple morality from the transcendent altogether, then we will end up talking about “the moral animal” like evolutionary psychologists.

    I once asked a Marxist sociology professor where our human nature “resides.” (Yes, it was a gotcha question!) He couldn’t say that, since we are made in the image of God, human nature resides in heaven. He couldn’t say that it resides in our DNA without joining the hated sociobiological positivists. He said, “I don’t know where it resides”—meaning that he wasn’t going to take the bait, and he wasn’t going to stop talking about human nature (or human species being) as if it resides in Camelot. But human nature and morality do, after all, have a residence, and it is in the Transcendent. So, while it is a good idea to give non-religious people credit for the quality of their moral intuitions and notice the moral failings of religious people, the conclusion to be drawn is not that morality is independent of religion but that the invisible church is not congruent with the visible church.

  • Wayne Lusvardi

    What I took from Dr. Berger’s discussion is that without institutional ethics we are left with someone’s equally good or even superior ethical system or behavior but with little consequence. Uncle Tom’s Cabin is wonderful literature but as the impetus for the end of slavery as an institution it has real power.

    On the other side of the coin I have difficulty with those who reduce religion to ethics, especially when the moral consequences of our actions or public policies are often unknown (thus Berger’s “postulate of ignorance”). The consequences of most social policies and social movements is often the opposite of what was intended; witness Daniel Moynihan’s classic work “Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding” about poverty programs. This might be useful in claiming moral “oneupmanship” while the welfare of humans is made worse; or the belief systems that give people meaning are destroyed.

    In the 1970′s Dr. Berger wrote a book Pyramids of Sacrifice about the ethical implications of social change. He warned about the “myth of growth” and the “myth of revolution.” It seems to me the U.S. experienced the “myth of growth” with the Mortgage Meltdown of 2008. Evangelical christian activists often advocated for low income housing for the poor with disastrous consequences for the beneficiaries of “sub-prime” loans with foreclosures, short sales, marriage dissolutions, and wiping out many small businesses that had loans collateralized by the equity in their homes. I have yet to hear of any regret, let alone repentance, for those religious motivated activists who advocated such ruinous policies. Let’s call this moral cognitive dissonance: the more evidence one is presented of the ruination of families and businesses the stronger one’s religious self righteousness becomes. Some Catholics also joined the chorus for affordable housing. So much for Dignitatus Humanae.

  • Wayne Lusvardi

    Additional note to above comment: Perhaps “ethical cognitive dissonance” or moral blindness is the opposite of Berger’s “anagnorisis” or recognition.

  • Wayne Lusvardi

    Religion can blind us or help us “recognize” a sense of paradox in life. For those who want to reduce religion to striving for social justice and human rights – via Digntatus Humanae – through an agnostic process (agnosis) religion can often end up diluted and dissolved and transformed into nothing but a political movement.

    But socially engineered secular modernity also often leads to the unintended consequences of social breakdown, chaotic relativism, and human suffering as demonstrated by the recent economic breakdown and malaise. The “anagnorosis” experience mentioned by Berger can also help us recognize this paradox.

  • TomK

    The self’s capacity for insight would seem to be a basic characteristic of consciouness. The quality of insight has changed in the course of our development. As anagnorosis it described the fatal dilemma of the logic of contradiction in Greek drama (“Count no man happy, till he be dead”), and provided the catharsis that came with recognition. With Aristotle it refered to empirical knowledge. Under monotheism, the inner world of a self-reflected Self revolved around questions of human individuality and the relationships it made possible, so that a notion of human dignity took on depth and complexity previously unheard of.

    Both religion and positivist science today try to reduce the historical consciousness to something caused by another (and so in their logic have moe in common than they would like to admit). Scientific reductionism would like to believe in biological cause and effect, religious fundamentalism in divine cause. The third possibility is rarely discussed, that our nature is causa sui, an emergent phenomenon of our biological and social complexity.

    Ethics requires no cause, biologically internal or externally through a divinity. Our dignity lies in our capacity to reflect upon selfhood. I and Thou are categories of subjectvity, not objects created by another. If God has any reality, then it is as an image of the possibility of subjective consciousness itself, and as such has been an essential point of reference for understanding what it can mean to be human.

    Today, self, differentiation and trancendence are being superceded by questions of interrelatedness, mortality and embodiment. Nature and cosmos are more helpful points of reference for this emergence than subjective divinities. Dignity at this stage seems to be a question of empathy and a capacity for engagement, in what Dr. Berger refers to as the intrinsic ability to perceive the dignity of nature and humanity. As this is now after thousands of years of Judeo-Christian history, universally available, religion may still provide useful orientation in its non- dogmatic form, but it is no longer required, and we are free to move on.

  • Gary Novak

    Tom K says we are now free to move on—beyond the external causation of self by God or nature. He proposes a little-discussed third possibility that we are “an emergent phenomenon of our biological and social complexity.” If I understand him rightly, he is saying that biological and social evolution have brought us to a point of self-consciousness where we are now autonomous—or can be, if we are willing to grow up and move on (.org?) But are we free NOT to move on—without being irresponsibly childish? He says that today issues like transcendence are being “superseded” by concerns about mortality and embodiment. In other words, instead of trying to become immortal by getting on the good side of Big Daddy, we are becoming adult enough to face the natural phenomenon of death. Nature and humanity, he hears Berger saying, have an intrinsic dignity.
    But here is what Berger says in “Questions of Faith”: “A popular cliché, elevated into alleged wisdom by various schools of philosophy, proposes that suffering and death should be accepted because they are ‘natural.’ This proposition must be emphatically rejected. On the contrary, it is ‘nature’—in the sense of the biological order of things—that is unacceptable. Death in particular is a brutal denial of the very essence of being human” (p. 40). There is a little more daylight between nature and humanity in Berger than Tom suspects. That is because Berger feels free NOT to move on. There is no imperative to embrace the “progressive” liquidation of the supernatural. Tom says “ethics requires no cause.” Berger says that “love for other human beings is linked with love of God. . . . Faith in God provides a transcendent meaning, an ontological foundation for all moral judgments and actions” (Ibid., p. 161).
    It is precisely because of the tendency of “enlightened” intellectuals to read God out of the universe and read progress in that I worried that Berger’s “Anthropology precedes ethics” would be misread as an invitation to do just that. I hope Tom will forgive me for using him as exhibit A, but individual exhibits are hardly necessary—one can point to European “Christophobia,” as George Weigel does in “The Cube and the Cathedral.” (The cube is the modernist structure—within sight of Notre Dame—that houses The International Foundation for Human Rights. Weigel uses it as a symbol of “ultramundane” or atheist humanism. Weigel, by the way, mentions Berger in his acknowledgements and has an essay in Berger’s “The Desecularization of the World”).
    In “Questions of Faith,” Berger cites Augustine’s observation that “no one indeed believes anything, unless he previously knew it to be believable” (p. 12). Or, as Berger might paraphrase it, no one believes anything for which there are no plausibility structures. Because the cultured despisers of religion have succeeded in destroying the plausibility structures for religion in enlightened circles, many intellectuals do not feel free, but compelled, to move on.

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