It was the best of times, but it may soon be the worst of times for the Chinese economy, says Tyler Cowen.
Subscribers to the Keynesian school of economics think China’s government can solve its economic problems:
Keynesians would argue that Beijing has the tools to stoke aggregate demand. It could, for example, adjust interest rates and bank reserve requirements, instruct state-owned banks to maintain lending, or deploy some of its $3 trillion in foreign exchange reserves. The government also appears to have many shovel-ready construction and infrastructure projects that could help the economy glide to a soft landing and then bounce back.
But Cowen thinks the more pessimistic Austrian school of economics provides the more prescient view. The Chinese government has been intervening in the economy for decades, subsidizing exports and manufacturing through currency intervention and loans and building massive infrastructure projects, including completely new, still-empty cities. This artificial boom can’t last, according to the Austrians:
The Austrian approach raises the possibility that there is no way for China to make good on enough of its oversubsidized investments. At first, they create lots of jobs and revenue, but as the business cycle proceeds, new marginal investments become less valuable and more prone to allocation by corruption. The giddy booms of earlier times wear off, and suddenly not every decision seems wise. The combination can lead to an economic crackup — not because aggregate demand is too low, but because the economy has been producing the wrong mix of goods and services. . . .
The jury is out. But to my eye, we may well find a significant and lasting disruption, closer to what the Austrian theory would predict. Consider a broader historical perspective: How often in world history have countries enjoyed 30-plus years of extremely rapid growth without a major economic tumble somewhere along the way?






