March 31, 2011

No Illusions

Andrew Sullivan is shocked and appalled that President Obama now seems committed to stretching coalition involvement in Libya beyond the narrow confines of the UN Security Council resolution:

It’s so surreal, so discordant with what the president has told the American people, so fantastically contrary to everything he campaigned on, that I will simply wait for more confirmation than this before commenting further. I simply cannot believe it. I know the president is not against all wars – just dumb ones. But could any war be dumber than this . . . ?

Unfortunately I can’t fault Sullivan too much for being surprised without also faulting myself. Up until March 19, I and many other people were confidently predicting that President Obama wouldn’t intervene in Libya. Yet in fact he has told us over the years, repeatedly, that Libya is precisely the kind of situation that he believes calls for American military engagement.

While I was busy swooning over the Niebuhrian echoes of Obama’s 2009 speech to the Nobel committee in Oslo, I somehow glossed over the fact that he cited the U.S. interventions in the Balkans as a legitimate use of firepower—and not merely for the humanitarian rationale but for democracy promotion as well. I’ll quote the speech at length, so you get a sense that this wasn’t just some passing comment on his part:

The service and sacrifice of our men and women in uniform has promoted peace and prosperity from Germany to Korea, and enabled democracy to take hold in places like the Balkans. We have borne this burden not because we seek to impose our will. We have done so out of enlightened self-interest. . . .

More and more, we all confront difficult questions about how to prevent the slaughter of civilians by their own government, or to stop a civil war whose violence and suffering can engulf an entire region.

I believe that force can be justified on humanitarian grounds, as it was in the Balkans, or in other places that have been scarred by war. Inaction tears at our conscience and can lead to more costly intervention later. That’s why all responsible nations must embrace the role that militaries with a clear mandate can play to keep the peace. . . .

When there is genocide in Darfur, systematic rape in Congo, repression in Burma — there must be consequences. Yes, there will be engagement; yes, there will be diplomacy — but there must be consequences when those things fail. . . .

In the American Conservative, Brendan O’Neill had already noted this tendency in candidate Barack Obama way back in 2008. O’Niell’s tone may be a bit over the top, but even when you filter the invective out, all the facts line up so neatly that I’m left asking myself why I didn’t see this coming, too.

But I think Sullivan is compounding this initial naivety with an additional one. He (and not just he, but David Rieff and others, too) seems to believe that it is now and always was feasible to strictly limit this mission a no-fly zone for humanitarian purposes. They seem to be saying that the foolish move was not that we intervened to prevent a massacre (a non-event that now resides in the ethereal realm of the counterfactual—at least for as long as we’re involved), but that we have apparently recast the mission in a regime-change and state-building mould.

The problem with this is what we might call the Heisenberg uncertainty principle of intervention. By intervening, we’ve irreversibly changed the political and military situation; in other words, we’ve become a Libyan political actor in our own right, changing the incentive structure for the belligerent parties.

We only need to look at the course of the war since our intervention to show this principle at work. Very shortly after the West established the no-fly zone, dismantled Qaddafi’s air defenses, and struck his ground forces besieging Benghazi (all of which were necessary components of preventing a massacre), the rebels pressed ahead with a major counteroffensive that took them all the way to the Qaddafi loyalist stronghold of Sirte. Qaddafi’s forces, however, have shown themselves equally capable of adapting to changed circumstances. They have renewed their offensive and are increasingly using civilian vehicles and superior tactics, making it difficult for coalition air assets to identify ground targets without risking civilian casualties. The coalition thus finds itself in a bind: Either it commits to deeper involvement (up to and including ground troops), or it risks the possibility of the rebels being overrun, possibly leading to the massacre the intervention was originally intended to prevent. Our mission, in effect, hinges on the fate of the east Libyan rebel forces. We cannot allow them to be overrun without our risking a humanitarian catastrophe.

The problem is that the rebel forces have a different set of political objectives than we do. Their endgame is the death of the regime (if not also Qaddafi’s head on a pike). And since we can’t afford to let them be overrun, that means that their mission, to a large extent, is ours too. Or, at a minimum, we can’t let them decisively lose.

Of course, it’s possible everything will work out for the best. The rebels win the day with just a tad more NATO airpower; Qaddafi’s regime rots from within; a democratic government springs forth from the North African sands; etc. But I’m not sure we should congratulate ourselves too heartily if things turn out this way. Humanitarian missions like this one are inherently open-ended affairs. We might get lucky and be able to do this one on the cheap, but as any poker player could tell you, getting lucky isn’t the same thing as making the smart play.

It’s possible, even probable, that the President already understands all of this, and that he has been talking out of both sides of his mouth about U.S. intentions in Libya. (Please understand that I don’t think that this kind of hypocrisy is necessarily a bad thing; indeed, it is an indispensable tool of statecraft.) If so, we can at least commend him for going into Libya clear-eyed and without any illusions. Whatever the wisdom of his initial decision, we’re in this together now, and so we can only wish him well, and our brave warriors a swift and decisive victory.

Posted in Intervention, Libya, Obama | Leave a comment
March 30, 2011

Down the Rabbit Hole, Redux: 43 Notes

On a few occasions in the past, I have commented on President Obama’s speeches by presenting the text above the line and using footnotes for my own text. I did this, for example, back on December 2009 with a comment called “90 Notes” and again on September 2, 2010 with one called “54 Notes.” In this case, I am annotating the President’s March 28, 2011 speech as a follow-on to a commentary I made on March 22, called “Down the Rabbit Hole: An Introduction to Operation Rapid Serpent.” I may have recourse to refer back to that article so that I (and you, the reader) are spared the burden of unnecessary repetition. As before, too, I will comment on the speechwriting elements of the text as well as on matters of substance; in this case, however, I will try to minimize the former as I often directly address the President in my remarks. So here goes:

* * *

The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, For Immediate Release, March 28, 2011 Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 7:31 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT:Tonight, I’d like to update the American people on the international effort that we have led in Libya –- what we’ve done, what we plan to do, and why this matters to us. I want to begin by paying tribute to our men and women in uniform who, once again, have acted with courage, professionalism and patriotism.  They have moved with incredible speed and strength.  Because of them and our dedicated diplomats, a coalition has been forged and countless lives have been saved.1The contention that “countless lives have been saved” goes to the heart of the President’s case for the Libya intervention, since the purpose of the intervention is not to effect regime change but is rather for humanitarian purposes. Unbelievable as it sounds, that’s what the man is saying. But as Daniel Kennelly and others have pointed out, this contention is based on a counterfactual: If we had not started a war, would the regime have massacred the residents of Benghazi? Maybe, maybe not. Guys like Qaddafi say lots of things they don’t mean. It made tactical sense to make such threats to try to disarm the opposition and make a regime victory less costly; whether a massacre would have actually occurred no one can possibly know. Presumably, the armed opposition currently doing pretty well would have resisted, and in the city center, where air power is not so useful, who can say what that fight might have looked like or what the outcome would have been? Who knows if regime forces would even have entered the city; regime spokesmen at the time claimed they wouldn’t, but of course these are guys one shouldn’t believe even if they claim that spinach is a vegetable. Moreover, what U.S. and allied airpower have done is to create a more level playing field for the civil war now going on. How can the President know in the longer run whether that level playing field will not prolong the war and end up getting vastly more people killed than might (or, again, might not) have died in Benghazi? Again, as Richard Haass and others have noted, he cannot possibly know.

Meanwhile, as we speak, our troops are supporting our ally Japan, leaving Iraq to its people, stopping the Taliban’s momentum in Afghanistan, and going after al Qaeda all across the globe.  As Commander-in-Chief, I’m grateful to our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and to their families. And I know all Americans share in that sentiment.2There is otherwise really nothing to comment on in this opening section; this is standard presidential-speech boilerplate, or what speechwriters call grace notes of a sort. The real question is whether the American soldiers, sailors and marines he has sent into harm’s way really feel that the President has their back if they get into trouble. I suspect they’re a little tentative about that, to put it generously.

For generations, the United States of America has played a unique role as an anchor of global security and as an advocate for human freedom.  Mindful of the risks and costs of military action, we are naturally reluctant to use force to solve the world’s many challenges.  But when our interests and values are at stake, we have a responsibility to act.3I fear that this phrase is a code word for “the responsibility to protect”, one of the most irresponsible UN gestures of recent years, one designed to legitimate “humanitarian interventions” at the same time that the UN system as a whole tries to ban the use of force for the protection of sovereign national interests.   That’s what happened in Libya over the course of these last six weeks.

 

Libya sits directly between Tunisia and Egypt -– two nations that inspired the world when their people rose up to take control of their own destiny.4They have not yet done so in Egypt, as the President has got to know. Great line for a speech, if you don’t look too hard at the reality it purports to describe.   For more than four decades, the Libyan people have been ruled by a tyrant -– Muammar Qaddafi.5Qaddafi has been a tyrant, to be sure, but he has not ruled alone. As noted in my March 22 essay, Libya is a tribal society, and Qaddafi has wide support in the western part of the country based on kinship ties and vast patronage networks fueled by oil money. Anyone who thinks he is a pushover, an isolated madman without any political clout in the country, does not understand Libyan society or politics.  He has denied his people freedom, exploited their wealth, murdered opponents at home and abroad, and terrorized innocent people around the world –- including Americans who were killed by Libyan agents.

Last month, Qaddafi’s grip of fear appeared to give way to the promise of freedom.  In cities and towns across the country, Libyans took to the streets to claim their basic human rights.  As one Libyan said, “For the first time we finally have hope that our nightmare of 40 years will soon be over.”6This, again, is great for an applause line in a speech, but it assumes that every opposition protest is ipso facto part of a democracy movement, and there is simply no evidence that this is on balance the case in Libya, or anywhere else in the Arab world right now. For what reality looks like in Egypt right now, see Samuel Tadros’s latest brilliant comment over in the Middle East blog, titled “Egypt, For Real”. In Libya, quite aside from the tribal dimension—which gives the conflict the flavor of a very traditional “rule or suffer” episode that Ibn Khaldun can educate you about, if you like, from the Muqaddimah—there is the matter of AQIM. AQIM stands for al-Qaeda in the Maghreb; it is an offshoot of one side (the worse of the two bad sides) of the Algerian civil war of just a few years past. It is dangerous and growing more so. We have testimony from a Libyan opposition leader named Abdel-Hakim al-Hasidi that al-Qaeda has been active in the Libyan fight on the opposition’s side. We have an AFP report from March 26 that al-Qaeda has stolen Libyan surface-to-air missiles and spirited them into Chad. We do not know very much about the Libyan opposition fighting Qaddafi, but the more we learn about it the less like a democracy movement it looks. The President’s remarks on this point are really stunning. This, too, is why the idea, popping up all over the place like cockroaches in a beggar’s kitchen, of our arming the Libyan opposition is so risky. It was one thing to arm the Afghan mujahideen in fighting the Red Army, which I supported, cause there was a near-term vital interest involved, and those who retrospectively excoriate the idea because of the Taliban know neither how policy must be made nor anything about the modern history of Afghanistan. But to take such risks in Libya, where there is no stake even remotely comparable to that in 1980s Afghanistan, is ill-advised.

Faced with this opposition, Qaddafi began attacking his people.7No, not exactly. The opposition began shooting first. But that’s just a detail isn’t it?  As President, my immediate concern was the safety of our citizens, so we evacuated our embassy and all Americans who sought our assistance.  Then we took a series of swift steps in a matter of days to answer Qaddafi’s aggression.  We froze more than $33 billion of Qaddafi’s regime’s assets.  Joining with other nations at the United Nations Security Council, we broadened our sanctions, imposed an arms embargo, and enabled Qaddafi and those around him to be held accountable for their crimes.  I made it clear that Qaddafi had lost the confidence of his people and the legitimacy to lead, and I said that he needed to step down from power.8It is amazing to me that the President would so casually repeat an earlier mistake. When he said a few weeks ago that Qaddafi had lost the legitimacy to rule, he implied that he once had it. But by democratic standards he never did, unless by legitimacy he means in the Libyan context that tribal might makes for tribal right. You can’t lose something you never had. Qaddafi seized power on September 1, 1969, overthrowing the Sanussi monarchy of King Idris that did have legitimacy, though not of a strictly democratic a sort. Why repeat an error? Curious.

In the face of the world’s condemnation, Qaddafi chose to escalate his attacks, launching a military campaign against the Libyan people.9The President speaks as though the opposition was not armed or organized in the slightest, that all the regime’s attacks were against pure innocent bystanders. This beggars belief.  Innocent people were targeted for killing. Hospitals and ambulances were attacked.  Journalists were arrested, sexually assaulted, and killed.  Supplies of food and fuel were choked off.  Water for hundreds of thousands of people in Misurata was shut off.  Cities and towns were shelled, mosques were destroyed, and apartment buildings reduced to rubble.  Military jets and helicopter gunships were unleashed upon people who had no means to defend themselves against assaults from the air.

Confronted by this brutal repression and a looming humanitarian crisis, I ordered warships into the Mediterranean.10The USS Kearsarge was already there, sir, on normal patrol, as were most of the other ships operating from the Med now. The Boxer, Green Bay and Comstock–amphibious strike force I–was also headed out in that general direction already, on a normal patrol deployment. I was on the ship when it left San Diego on February 22 for Pearl Harbor and points beyond. So, please…  European allies declared their willingness to commit resources to stop the killing.11You make it sound like we acted first and then the European allies came around, when you know perfectly well it was the other way around. How short do you think people’s memories are? Wait, don’t answer that question…you might be right.  The Libyan opposition and the Arab League appealed to the world to save lives in Libya.  And so at my direction, America led an effort with our allies at the United Nations Security Council to pass a historic resolution that authorized a no-fly zone to stop the regime’s attacks from the air, and further authorized all necessary measures to protect the Libyan people.

Ten days ago, having tried to end the violence without using force, the international community offered Qaddafi a final chance to stop his campaign of killing, or face the consequences.  Rather than stand down, his forces continued their advance, bearing down on the city of Benghazi, home to nearly 700,000 men, women and children who sought their freedom from fear.12This last phrase, “who sought their freedom from fear”, is way over the top—bad speechwriting. Possibly the speechwriter, probably Ben Rhodes, reassigned to the starting rotation in a pinch, was trying to be Rooseveltian here. It doesn’t work. In general, too, the speech is marred by its oscillations between its matter-of-fact tone in some places and its soaring rhetoric in others. Like the ideas in it, the speech itself is schizoid.

At this point, the United States and the world faced a choice.  Qaddafi declared he would show “no mercy” to his own people.  He compared them to rats, and threatened to go door to door to inflict punishment.  In the past, we have seen him hang civilians in the streets, and kill over a thousand people in a single day.13The President seems to be referring to the Busalim prison massacre of 1996. Some 1,270 prisoners were murdered, all but a few of them Islamists. Killing prisoners, however, after a prison revolt, isn’t the same as what Hafiz al-Asad did in Hama in 1982, or what Qaddafi might or might not have done in Benghazi. Not that it’s pretty, of course; but it’s not the same sort of event.  Now we saw regime forces on the outskirts of the city.  We knew that if we wanted — if we waited one more day, Benghazi, a city nearly the size of Charlotte, could14Yes, “could”, not necessarily would. To base a war on a counterfactual is a form of pre-emption, it is not? I thought you were against that. suffer a massacre that would have reverberated across the region and stained the conscience of the world.

It was not in our national interest to let that happen.  I refused to let that happen.15Grandstanding persiflage. You, Mr. President, were entirely ready to let it happen before your Secretary of State flipped on you and you had the international cover you thought you could use to avoid taking the lion’s share of responsibility for the consequences of starting a war.   And so nine days ago, after consulting the bipartisan leadership of Congress, I authorized military action to stop the killing and enforce U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973.16Nowhere in this speech does the President use the word “war.” Just like he seems not to know what a “civilian” is—see my March 22 article—he seems not to know what a “war” is either. Where is George Orwell when you need him? When you fire over 300 cruise missiles at someone’s capital city, and drop 500-pound bombs on his forces, and bomb a country’s airfields with B-2 bombers flying from Missouri, you have started a war. There is simply no other word for it.  

We struck regime forces approaching Benghazi to save that city and the people within it.  We hit Qaddafi’s troops in neighboring Ajdabiya, allowing the opposition to drive them out. We hit Qaddafi’s air defenses, which paved the way for a no-fly zone.  We targeted tanks and military assets that had been choking off towns and cities, and we cut off much of their source of supply.  And tonight, I can report that we have stopped Qaddafi’s deadly advance.17You have stopped it temporarily, but as your own Pentagon says, stop the air operations and the whole situation could and probably would flip right around again. You have now got yourself in a position where we cannot stop the military action without jeopardizing what it has accomplished. That is why, in my March 22 essay, I characterized this operation as essentially open-ended, and not just for that reason. Yet Mr. President, you say virtually nothing about outcomes in your speech. You talk of processes, with the UN and so on, as if that is enough to justify the use of force. It’s the outcome that matters, and your reluctance to address the connection between the use of U.S. military power and that outcome is distressing. This is a point I will return to in a moment.

In this effort, the United States has not acted alone. Instead, we have been joined by a strong and growing coalition. This includes our closest allies -– nations like the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Italy, Spain, Greece, and Turkey –- all of whom have fought by our sides for decades.  And it includes Arab partners like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, who have chosen to meet their responsibilities to defend the Libyan people.18This is totally disingenuous. The Arabs and other allies in this coalition are far more “window dressing” that the allies the Bush Administration assembled for the Iraq War, which you derided as such at the time when you were in the Senate. The U.S. military has undertaken by far the vast majority of the sorties flown, and the bombs dropped, over Libya, and there is little likelihood that our allies can assume the brunt of what we have been doing just because we say we’ve “handed it off” to NATO.

To summarize, then:  In just one month, the United States has worked with our international partners to mobilize a broad coalition, secure an international mandate to protect civilians, stop an advancing army, prevent a massacre, and establish a no-fly zone with our allies and partners.  To lend some perspective on how rapidly this military and diplomatic response came together, when people were being brutalized in Bosnia in the 1990s, it took the international community more than a year to intervene with air power to protect civilians.  It took us 31 days.19It would have taken fewer days if you had not wisely resisted the siren call of the French and British. The Bosnia operation was also a mistake, in my view; we settled nothing there, really. We just froze the conflict, and it will unfreeze one day when we least wish it to. Ah, but that’s another story.

Moreover, we’ve accomplished these objectives consistent with the pledge that I made to the American people at the outset of our military operations.  I said that America’s role would be limited; that we would not put ground troops into Libya; that we would focus our unique capabilities on the front end of the operation and that we would transfer responsibility to our allies and partners.  Tonight, we are fulfilling that pledge.20But for how long? As I and others have pointed out, having started this war, we cannot leave Qaddafi standing when the shooting stops. He will be extraordinarily dangerous, far more so, in my view, than he would have been to us and our allies had we not fired hundreds of millions of dollars of ordnance at him. As I said in my March 22 essay, someone needs to go get him. If the opposition can’t, and I doubt they can take Tripoli, and if the French and British either don’t try or try and fail, who do you suppose is going to have to do this, sooner or later, one way or another? Really, sir.

Our most effective alliance, NATO, has taken command of the enforcement of the arms embargo and the no-fly zone.  Last night, NATO decided to take on the additional responsibility of protecting Libyan civilians.  This transfer from the United States to NATO will take place on Wednesday.21Yes, but it won’t change the balance of the burden. Just calling it a NATO operation won’t change the U.S. need to lead the fight, because no one else can do it.  Going forward, the lead in enforcing the no-fly zone and protecting civilians on the ground will transition to our allies and partners, and I am fully confident that our coalition will keep the pressure on Qaddafi’s remaining forces. 

In that effort, the United States will play a supporting role — including intelligence, logistical support, search and rescue assistance, and capabilities to jam regime communications.22This is also disingenuous. We have in fact been doing more in recent days, not less. In recent days we have introduced A-10 Warthogs and AC-130 Gunships into the fight. And we are not using these and other platforms to “protect civilians”—we are using them to attack and destroy the Libyan military. When we attack Tripoli and Sirte (Qaddafi’s hometown), there are no civilians at risk in those places because they are on Qaddafi’s side. That is why the Arab League (and the oh, so predictable Russians, in the person of that human reptile Sergei Lavrov) are now criticizing you for going way beyond the UN mandate, and that is because you are, and that is because the mandate was ridiculous and unimplementable from the start. Because of this transition to a broader, NATO-based coalition, the risk and cost of this operation — to our military and to American taxpayers — will be reduced significantly.23Not bloody likely. This open-ended commitment—and it will turn out that way no matter what you think now, sir—is not nearly over or hardly predictable. Let’s reckon the costs when it is over, and we’ll see who was right, OK?

So for those who doubted our capacity to carry out this operation, I want to be clear:  The United States of America has done what we said we would do.24This really gets to the nub of the matter. We said we would prevent a humanitarian outrage, but we will not know the body count, and whose bodies will be counted, until this is over—and, as already noted, this is not yet near to being over. The President seems to be trying to avoid responsibility for the outcome by artificially and prematurely claiming “mission accomplished.” Does this remind you of anything, or of some other President, perhaps?

That’s not to say that our work is complete.  In addition to our NATO responsibilities, we will work with the international community to provide assistance to the people of Libya, who need food for the hungry and medical care for the wounded.  We will safeguard the more than $33 billion that was frozen from the Qaddafi regime so that it’s available to rebuild Libya.  After all, the money doesn’t belong to Qaddafi or to us — it belongs to the Libyan people.  And we’ll make sure they receive it.25Who are we going to turn this money over to? The next formally recognized Libya government, right? What if there isn’t one for a long time? What if it turns out to be de facto an Islamist government, or possibly in the process of becoming one? We still going to give them $33 billion? Better not to have mentioned this, seems to me, or to have made any promises.

Tomorrow, Secretary Clinton will go to London, where she will meet with the Libyan opposition and consult with more than 30 nations.  These discussions will focus on what kind of political effort is necessary to pressure Qaddafi, while also supporting a transition to the future that the Libyan people deserve — because while our military mission is narrowly focused on saving lives, we continue to pursue the broader goal of a Libya that belongs not to a dictator, but to its people.26OK, here is where the President and his Administration go even further down the rabbit hole. What this speech as a whole says is that we will use American military power for humanitarian ends, but we will pursue regime change only with others and only by political and diplomatic means. This is a complete inversion of common sense and millennia of statecraft practice. Political and diplomatic means are typically brought to bear in humanitarian crises and, short of literal genocide (a word way too loosely thrown around lately), that is how it should be. That’s why no U.S. or other external force has been used in Congo, for example, or in Ivory Coast, where there are good guys and bad guys no less clearly on view than is the case in Libya. If we take the President at his word, we should then expect force to be used in Congo and Sierra Leone (and maybe Syria, Bahrain, Yemen, etc., etc.) any day now, if there is UN sanction for it, because the situations are not different in kind from that in Libya. In all these cases tenured but non-democratic regimes are using deadly force against their political opponents. But if we need to overthrow an extremely dangerous regime that threatens the United States and it allies, as Qaddafi’s will be if he survives the present fight, we have to rely on political and diplomatic means to do that? Are you kidding? (This reminds me a little of the Democrats’ argument before the 1991 Gulf War that sanctions would change the Iraqi regime without war, when even a victorious war failed to achieve that end.) This is madness. It is down the rabbit hole all the way to Shanghai.

Now, despite the success of our efforts over the past week, I know that some Americans continue to have questions about our efforts in Libya.27You think?  Qaddafi has not yet stepped down from power, and until he does, Libya will remain dangerous.28Thanks for admitting it. Libya can remain dangerous even after he is gone, too, as my March 22 essay describes.  Moreover, even after Qaddafi does leave power, 40 years of tyranny has left Libya fractured and without strong civil institutions.  The transition to a legitimate government that is responsive to the Libyan people will be a difficult task.29Yes, it will. Who will police it? Who will pay for it? Who will get UN authorization for it? General Stavridis has already suggested that since we did peacekeeping in the Balkans, we might to it in Libya, too. Is that your policy, sir? It seems not. I don’t hear you volunteering American power and money for this; indeed, your diplomatic body language points in rather the other direction. So who, then, will take all this on? The Mad Hatter and his friends?   And while the United States will do our part to help, it will be a task for the international community and –- more importantly –- a task for the Libyan people themselves.

In fact, much of the debate in Washington has put forward a false choice when it comes to Libya.  On the one hand, some question why America should intervene at all -– even in limited ways –- in this distant land.  They argue that there are many places in the world where innocent civilians face brutal violence at the hands of their government, and America should not be expected to police the world, particularly when we have so many pressing needs here at home.30That is really disingenuous. Most of those opposed to this intervention from the get-go, including your own Defense Secretary and National Security Advisor, are asking you to justify it in national security terms, and to connect military means to political ends. You’re trying to make all those who question the wisdom of this intervention look like isolationists. That is so foul, sir.

It’s true that America cannot use our military wherever repression occurs.  And given the costs and risks of intervention, we must always measure our interests against the need for action.  But that cannot be an argument for never acting on behalf of what’s right.  In this particular country -– Libya  — at this particular moment, we were faced with the prospect of violence on a horrific scale.31Again, conjecture, but not wholly unreasonable conjecture, granted.  We had a unique ability to stop that violence:  an international mandate for action, a broad coalition prepared to join us, the support of Arab countries, and a plea for help from the Libyan people themselves.  We also had the ability to stop Qaddafi’s forces in their tracks without putting American troops on the ground.

To brush aside America’s responsibility as a leader and -– more profoundly -– our responsibilities to our fellow human beings under such circumstances would have been a betrayal of who we are.  Some nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocities in other countries.  The United States of America is different.  And as President, I refused to wait for the images of slaughter and mass graves before taking action.

Moreover, America has an important strategic interest in preventing Qaddafi from overrunning those who oppose him.  A massacre would have driven thousands of additional refugees across Libya’s borders, putting enormous strains on the peaceful –- yet fragile -– transitions in Egypt and Tunisia.  The democratic impulses that are dawning across the region would be eclipsed by the darkest form of dictatorship, as repressive leaders concluded that violence is the best strategy to cling to power.32It does not follow that whatever happens in Libya will affect what happens in other Arab countries. The regime in Bahrain, for example, is fighting for its life in a zero-sum sectarian conflict. It has to act as though existential stakes are at risk, because in fact they are. The idea that the Al-Khalifa might act differently if Qaddafi loses power in Libya is a fantasy. Rather the same goes for what’s happening in Yemen, Syria and the rest of the region.   The writ of the United Nations Security Council would have been shown to be little more than empty words, crippling that institution’s future credibility to uphold global peace and security.33This is really rich. This argument, almost verbatim, is what the Bush Administration said about Iraq. At the time Senator Obama ridiculed this claim. Now he makes it, pertaining to a case in which a much lesser threat to American interests is involved—a least so it seemed before the WMD fear was proven to be mostly unfounded.  So while I will never minimize the costs involved in military action, I am convinced that a failure to act in Libya would have carried a far greater price for America.

Now, just as there are those who have argued against intervention in Libya, there are others who have suggested that we broaden our military mission beyond the task of protecting the Libyan people, and do whatever it takes to bring down Qaddafi and usher in a new government.

Of course, there is no question that Libya -– and the world –- would be better off with Qaddafi out of power.  I, along with many other world leaders, have embraced that goal, and will actively pursue it through non-military means.34A joke, right, sir? If a military operation fails to get rid of him, you think UN talkfests will? Why don’t I feel like laughing?  But broadening our military mission to include regime change would be a mistake.

The task that I assigned our forces -– to protect the Libyan people from immediate danger, and to establish a no-fly zone -– carries with it a U.N. mandate and international support.  It’s also what the Libyan opposition asked us to do.  If we tried to overthrow Qaddafi by force, our coalition would splinter.35It already has since we’ve already obviously crept (I use the word advisedly) way beyond the “protect civilians” phase. See note 22 above, about the Arab League and the Russians. Love that re-set, don’t we now?  We would likely have to put U.S. troops on the ground to accomplish that mission, or risk killing many civilians from the air.  The dangers faced by our men and women in uniform would be far greater.  So would the costs and our share of the responsibility for what comes next.36We will not escape these costs; having started this war, we will have no choice but to end it if someone else can’t.

To be blunt, we went down that road in Iraq.  Thanks to the extraordinary sacrifices of our troops and the determination of our diplomats, we are hopeful about Iraq’s future.  But regime change there took eight years, thousands of American and Iraqi lives, and nearly a trillion dollars.  That is not something we can afford to repeat in Libya.

As the bulk of our military effort ratchets down, what we can do — and will do — is support the aspirations of the Libyan people.  We have intervened to stop a massacre, and we will work with our allies and partners to maintain the safety of civilians. We will deny the regime arms, cut off its supplies of cash, assist the opposition, and work with other nations to hasten the day when Qaddafi leaves power.  It may not happen overnight, as a badly weakened Qaddafi tries desperately to hang on to power.  But it should be clear to those around Qaddafi, and to every Libyan, that history is not on Qaddafi’s side.  With the time and space that we have provided for the Libyan people, they will be able to determine their own destiny, and that is how it should be.37Yes, that is how it should be. But what if it doesn’t turn out that way? Where’s your Phase IV planning, sir? Where’s anything but your best-case analysis? 

Let me close by addressing what this action says about the use of America’s military power, and America’s broader leadership in the world, under my presidency.
As Commander-in-Chief, I have no greater responsibility than keeping this country safe.  And no decision weighs on me more than when to deploy our men and women in uniform.  I’ve made it clear that I will never hesitate to use our military swiftly, decisively, and unilaterally when necessary to defend our people, our homeland, our allies and our core interests.  That’s why we’re going after al Qaeda wherever they seek a foothold.  That is why we continue to fight in Afghanistan, even as we have ended our combat mission in Iraq and removed more than 100,000 troops from that country. 

There will be times, though, when our safety is not directly threatened, but our interests and our values are.  Sometimes, the course of history poses challenges that threaten our common humanity and our common security -– responding to natural disasters, for example; or preventing genocide and keeping the peace; ensuring regional security, and maintaining the flow of commerce.  These may not be America’s problems alone, but they are important to us.  They’re problems worth solving.  And in these circumstances, we know that the United States, as the world’s most powerful nation, will often be called upon to help.

In such cases, we should not be afraid to act -– but the burden of action should not be America’s alone.  As we have in Libya, our task is instead to mobilize the international community for collective action.  Because contrary to the claims of some, American leadership is not simply a matter of going it alone and bearing all of the burden ourselves.  Real leadership creates the conditions and coalitions for others to step up as well; to work with allies and partners so that they bear their share of the burden and pay their share of the costs; and to see that the principles of justice and human dignity are upheld by all.38This, from the Niebuhrian Nobel Peace Prize speech, is right. Several articles in the forthcoming issue of The American Interest (by Jim Thomas, Kori Schake and others) make this argument. But as used here, this is a neon red herring. You talk like other Administrations wished to act alone when they did not need to. That’s simply false.

That’s the kind of leadership we’ve shown in Libya.  Of course, even when we act as part of a coalition, the risks of any military action will be high.  Those risks were realized when one of our planes malfunctioned over Libya.  Yet when one of our airmen parachuted to the ground, in a country whose leader has so often demonized the United States –- in a region that has such a difficult history with our country –- this American did not find enemies.  Instead, he was met by people who embraced him.  One young Libyan who came to his aid said, “We are your friends.  We are so grateful to those men who are protecting the skies.”

This voice is just one of many in a region where a new generation is refusing to be denied their rights and opportunities any longer. 

Yes, this change will make the world more complicated for a time.39Now the President is essentially quoting Condoleezza Rice’s “birth pangs of a new era” remark. So it’s not enough that his policy is one that qualifies as Paul Wolfowitz-lite; the language has to mimic Condoleezza Rice? Somebody pinch me, please; this is all a little hard to take.  Progress will be uneven, and change will come differently to different countries.  There are places, like Egypt, where this change will inspire us and raise our hopes.  And then there will be places, like Iran, where change is fiercely suppressed.  The dark forces of civil conflict and sectarian war will have to be averted, and difficult political and economic concerns will have to be addressed. 

The United States will not be able to dictate the pace and scope of this change.  Only the people of the region can do that. But we can make a difference.

 

I believe that this movement of change cannot be turned back, and that we must stand alongside those who believe in the same core principles that have guided us through many storms:  our opposition to violence directed at one’s own people; our support for a set of universal rights, including the freedom for people to express themselves and choose their leaders; our support for governments that are ultimately responsive to the aspirations of the people.40Again, it remains to be seen what the Arab street really wants, and can get. I have an open mind about the young people twittering themselves into a revolutionary fervor these days—God bless them. Obviously, things have changed in the Arab world. The word democracy was unintelligible to most Arabs just a decade or so ago; a loan word in Arabic, it meant “good governance” very generally and vaguely. It meant not the thugs and thieves we have now. It had no meaning in the Western procedural sense. Maybe now it does. That’s good, and certainly the United States must never betray or abandon true democrats. But it is not a foregone conclusion that they represent anything like a majority in any Arab country, even Egypt or Tunisia, or that they can prevail over the forces of non-democratic continuity in those places and others. The Middle Eastern country arguably closest to an understanding and yearning for true democracy along the lines that we understand it is Iran—not an Arab country and obviously in a difficult and very different situation.

Born, as we are, out of a revolution by those who longed to be free, we welcome the fact that history is on the move in the Middle East and North Africa, and that young people are leading the way.  Because wherever people long to be free, they will find a friend in the United States.  Ultimately, it is that faith — those ideals — that are the true measure of American leadership.41It is as unwise to use the word “faith” here as it was for George W. Bush once to use the word “crusade.” When this speech is translated into Arabic and traditional folk read it, they will read “faith” out of Obama’s mouth as Christianity. That will not be good.

My fellow Americans, I know that at a time of upheaval overseas — when the news is filled with conflict and change — it can be tempting to turn away from the world.42Again with the red herring. This is a Trotskyite rhetorical tactic—to associate those who disagree with you to the far outer fringe of some position they do not in fact hold. The idea that anyone who disagrees on prudential grounds with this military intervention is an isolationist is really beyond the pale. It is downright insulting.  And as I’ve said before, our strength abroad is anchored in our strength here at home.  That must always be our North Star — the ability of our people to reach their potential, to make wise choices with our resources, to enlarge the prosperity that serves as a wellspring for our power, and to live the values that we hold so dear.

But let us also remember that for generations, we have done the hard work of protecting our own people, as well as millions around the globe.  We have done so because we know that our own future is safer, our own future is brighter, if more of mankind can live with the bright light of freedom and dignity. 

Tonight, let us give thanks for the Americans who are serving through these trying times, and the coalition that is carrying our effort forward.  And let us look to the future with confidence and hope not only for our own country, but for all those yearning for freedom around the world.43All I can say after listening to and reading this strategically incoherent statement is that I hope that you, Mr. President, are an effectual and necessary hypocrite, that you are once again, as you admitted doing before during the Egyptian crisis, speaking out of both sides of your mouth. You care about coalition maintenance, and about appearing virtual and noble (or Nobel–spell it however you like). Well, fine; that’s politics, I guess. As my friend, Kenyon professor Fred Baumann, brilliantly out it, you are expert at practicing “diplomacy as vanity,” seeming to care more about how things look than about how they really are. Still, I cannot bring myself to believe that you would really trust diplomacy and sanctions alone to oust Qaddafi if he looks to survive the present phase of this war. That would be roughly as irresponsible as having started the war in the first place. I am obviously not privy to what you have been saying to Admiral Mullen and General Ham at Africom. I just hope that the ceaseless beating the Libyans are taking from the air, even in places where no “civilians” are or have ever been at risk from regime forces, is on your order. And I hope we get lucky and it turns the trick. But if it doesn’t, you, sir, are not going to be redeemed by this or any other speech.

Thank you.  God bless you, and may God bless the United States of America.  (Applause.)  Thank you.

Posted in Intervention, Libya, Politics | Leave a comment
March 23, 2011

Against Humanitarian Intervention

The argument one’s been hearing most of all from critics of the intervention in Libya has been over consistency. If we’re so keen on invading Libya for ostensibly humanitarian reasons, why aren’t we fighting a war in Bahrain, Yemen or Côte d’Ivoire? The implication here is two-fold: that the Obama Administration has embarked on this questionable endeavor for reasons that are more nefarious than they’re admitting to in public (“it’s about power,” gravely intones Eugene Robinson in the Washington Post to Glenn Greenwald’s applause); and that the defenders of the war are arguing in bad faith.

It’s impossible to tell at this early juncture exactly what rationale the White House settled on behind closed doors. We only have sketchy reports from the New York Times and Foreign Policy that the debate was heated, and that the “winners” were human rights advocates Samantha Power, Ambassador Susan Rice, and Ben Rhodes, with the otherwise-cautious Secretary Clinton providing the final push in convincing President Obama to act. Secretary Gates’s grudging and circumspect statements on the war before and after the decision certainly suggest that the realists around the table were not fully heeded.

But let’s not read the tea leaves too much. The Administration said that it seeks to avert the slaughter that would inevitably follow a Qaddafi victory, and, more tendentiously, that it wants to prevent the events in Libya from putting an end to the evolving Arab Spring. Why search for motive further than that? I fail to see how it can be about “power” however you choose to conceive of the term: Libya is too small an oil producer to warrant this kind of intervention; Qaddafi is at best an insignificant player in the region—indeed, one who had been cooperating with us for the last seven years—so it’s not like we had anything to prove. Perhaps President Obama wanted to protect his foreign policy bona fides for the upcoming elections, but those are far enough away, and the two wars we’re already engaged in are unpopular enough, that it’s a less-than-even bet that this is the case. Apart from humanitarian concerns, therefore, I just don’t see an explanation that makes any sense.

This is not to say that the intervention is a good idea on the merits—far from it. There are many questions and precious few answers about the thinking (or lack thereof) that went into the decision, as Adam Garfinkle points out elsewhere in our pages. It’s just that there’s probably nothing more sinister afoot than a military intervention wholly in service to humanitarian goals. (And that’s plenty bad enough!)

The other problem with the criticism epitomized by Greenwald and Robinson is that it perversely allows liberal interventionists to sound reasonable without grappling with the shakiness of their core principles. “Of course we’d love to do something about Bahrain and Yemen,” they say, “but geopolitical constraints being what they are, we can only do so much. If we could we would! But tackling a bad guy Qaddafi, let’s not forget, is a good in itself.” Until these kinds of arguments are met head-on, we can expect to hear them voiced every time the opportunity presents itself. What follows, therefore, is a rough attempt to lay out an honest challenge to the liberal interventionist:

1) State-sponsored mass killing is a great evil, but more often than not, it is a product of politics. The failure to adequately account for this ugly fact is the single biggest flaw in interventionist thinking. Samantha Power’s well-researched and grippingly written account of genocide in the 20th century, A Problem from Hell, is notable for how assiduously it manages to brush off these kinds of concerns. To take two examples: Saddam’s genocidal Anfal campaign against the Kurds was criminally bestial and inexcusable, but lurking behind Saddam’s actions was the Kurds’ long-stated desire to secede from Iraq; and Milosevic’s and Karadzic’s aggressive expansionist campaigns mercilessly wiped out entire communities, but it’s far from clear that Bosnia had any kind of peaceful future outside the framework of Yugoslavia.

Genocides are like horrible little snowflakes, each one unique in its own way. Their qualities must inform how we deal with them. The interventionist’s dogged adherence to the post-Holocaust “never again” screed is therefore quite dangerous. Though not all genocides are Hitlerian in their devotion to pure ideology, the interventionist puts the moral obligation above other political considerations: “genocide is an absolute evil that must be stopped if at all possible.” The no-fly zone over northern Iraq stopped the slaughter of the Kurds, but it punted on their national question. Our subsequent involvement in deposing Saddam and the costly rebuilding of Iraq are still a mere band-aid over that long-suffering nation (one that incidentally cost tens of thousands of additional Iraqi lives). The Dayton Accords for Bosnia were comparatively cheap to come by, costing us a couple billion dollars in reconstruction aid, and the flight of a couple hundred thousand Serbian civilians from Croatian territory (the majority of which never returned). But even after 15 years of peace and mediation, Bosnia is far from at peace with itself, and threatens to unleash demons on the region once again as it continues to fray.

Counterfactual tallies of victims who would have perished had we not acted as we did are both impossible to arrive at and in poor taste. What is clear, however, is that most advocates of humanitarian intervention still do not clearly reckon with the likely costs of the wars they advocate, largely because they refuse to take into account uncomfortable political realities and the ways those realities play out afterwards. It makes sense, therefore, that Qaddafi’s truculent threats to terminate the rebellion in Benghazi with extreme prejudice caught the ear of Samantha Power’s contingent at the NSC with an irresistibly shrill pitch. And it’s no surprise that you have people like Jonathan Chait glibly claiming that getting rid of Qaddafi will be done “at a reasonable cost,” and people like Max Boot only belatedly realizing that even our preferred outcome in Libya carries outsized risks.

2) We should always do what we can to deter genocide, but we must never think it wise to pre-empt it. Speaking of counterfactuals, pre-emptive intervention carries all sorts of problems centering around intentionality, most of which are unresolvable. We will never be able to prove the true intentions of an actor if he in fact is not allowed to act. This does not mean, of course, that we should sit idly by as a regime shows signs of menacing its population. Power’s book is an exhaustive catalogue of opportunities throughout the decades that American statesmen and legislators missed to threaten and cajole bloody-minded governments. Her argument, that this kind of humanitarian bullying has not been adequately tried, is quite convincing. Nevertheless, even a stated intent to massacre an opposition in defeat shouldn’t be cause enough for military intervention. In the case of Libya, intervening as we have before Qaddafi did his worst leaves us justifying our policy with all sort of weak, second-order arguments about Qaddafi’s threat to his neighbors and to the Arab Spring.

3) Client states usually get the better of their patrons. This one’s as old as history itself, but it tends to get lost on people as their moral certitude increases. Afghanistan is the canonical example here—a borderland that has successfully milked its wealthy and powerful protector empires for money and resources by playing on their fears and insecurities. The fabled Great Game can be understood as an entire procession of Afghan rulers playing the British off against the Russians, and there’s more than a hint of that same dynamic in place today. More recently, Russia and the United States nearly came to blows in the Caucasus, as the Ossetian separatist movement compelled Russia to intervene in Georgia, a country with irrationally exuberant supporters in the United States. Though in the case of Afghanistan the illusion is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain, the overriding sentiment in the patron state is that we’re fighting on behalf of “the good guys” against an oppressor, whereas the calculus for the client state is that it is trying to maximally improve its standing. The lessons for our Libyan incursion are manifest.

4) “Responsibility to Protect” is a nebulous norm which is easy to exploit. Speaking of Georgia and South Ossetia, the Russians have taken great pleasure in defending their incursion into Georgia by saying that the Ossetian minority was in danger of being overrun by an oppressive central government. You don’t have to buy the Russian argument to find the norm troubling, however. We shy away from providing a discrete number of casualties which would upgrade an atrocity to a genocide (lest a violator keep his killing just below that number); however, by not specifying an explicit threshold we set up a system in which powerful states can intervene pretty much at will (especially when the premise of pre-emption is accepted). One can argue that this is not much of a concern either way, as powerful states will do as they please, arriving at retroactive explanations for their actions. But a strong believer in norms needs to figure how to square this circle, because Responsibility to Protect only legitimately “works” if you have near-omniscient knowledge of all the actors’ motivations and intentions.

These are but four jabs at the problems inherent in liberal interventionism. Neoconservatives, being as they’re surer of the infallibility and inherent goodness of the United States no matter how it acts, are less likely to be troubled by some of these points than others. No matter. It’s most important that the argument against the current war does not hinge merely on the inconsistency of the interventionist argument (if Libya, then why not Yemen?). Unless the rationales for interventionism are debated on their own terms, the next time, with even less prudent leadership, we may find ourselves in Yemen, Bahrain, Côte d’Ivoire, and several other places beyond my current imagination.

Posted in Intervention, Obama, Politics | 5 Comments
February 25, 2011

P.J. Harvey’s Black Painting

As you look back over the past decade of popular music, the thing that stands out is how introspective and self-obsessed much of it has been. Given the significance of the events that transpired in the 2000s—from the attacks of 9/11, to an unprecedented two simultaneous foreign wars waged by the United States, to a financial crisis that brought the Western world to the brink—it’s remarkable that musicians had so little regard for the world around them.

It perhaps shouldn’t be too surprising that Billboard’s top twenty grossing records of the decade were intellectually irrelevant, given how good the major label music industry had become at polishing their products for mass consumption. But the situation is not much better when you look at several critics’ polls for the decade, most of which are stocked with independent artists on smaller labels. It’s not just that few of the records are even remotely political; it’s that almost none attempt to deal with the world in any way except the intensely personal. (The only obvious exceptions on the Rolling Stone top 100 list are Bruce Springsteen, with his post-9/11 rumination The Rising, the English and Sri Lankan artist M.I.A., whose second album Kala dabbled in political activism, and Green Day’s American Idiot, which hamfistedly grappled with terrorism paranoia.) If popular music can be said to be a kind of mirror for the spirit of our time, our era is resoundingly a catatonic one.

It was therefore an unfamiliar pleasure that came over me as I started listening to P.J. Harvey’s latest album, Let England Shake. Here at last was someone ungluing her eyes and taking the gauze from her ears to engage with what was going on around her. More remarkable still was the subtlety and dexterity with which she tackled her notoriously difficult subject: war.

The album hardly came from nowhere. Polly Jean Harvey has had a storied and very successful career since she broke out in the early 1990s. I recall seeing the video for her single “50 ft Queenie” in steady rotation when as a teenager I stayed up late for MTV’s indie rock showcase 120 Minutes. Even early on, she revealed an uncanny ability to disquiet her audience—in this case double-tracking her vocals, with one track sung in a much higher register but also more quietly, giving a distinctly hysterical wheeze to the arrangement. By 2001, three albums later, she was recognized as an accomplished songwriter by being awarded the prestigious Mercury prize for Stories from the City, Stories from the Sea. (Incidentally, a rattled Harvey accepted the prize over the phone from Washington on the afternoon of September 11th as she watched the Pentagon burn outside her hotel room window.) Perhaps feeling liberated by this new sense of achievement, she released ever-sparser, darker and inward-looking records throughout the aughties.

By any measure, though, Let England Shake is a very different record than anything she’s attempted before. Whereas most of her earlier work growls in one way or another, this effort shimmers—the guitars positively chime with reverb and the vocals are similarly cloaked in some sort of echo. Rhythmically, the songs are short, simple affairs, gently shuffling along. The drama comes from her floating, distant-sounding voice and haunting minor chord accompaniments. The result is eerily hypnotic and sadly beautiful. Within this context, the lyrical content is arresting. Patriotic without being jingoistic, awed by war’s brutality and cost without moralizing, Harvey paints a deeply moving, and very English, tableau about that most ancient and most human of activities.

The opening title track sets the tone for the record, a mix of elegy and frustration. “The West’s asleep, let England shake,” she spectrally warns as she strums her autoharp over a jaunty piano line. “I fear our blood won’t rise again. England’s dancing days are done.” The culprit, she tells us, is willful indifference. “Smile, smile Bobby, with your lovely mouth. Pack up your troubles and let’s head out to the fountain… swim back and forth and laugh out loud.”

The indifference, one surmises, is towards history, its cruelty, and the inevitability of its repetition. In “The Words that Maketh Murder,” Harvey mocks the dream of setting up human institutions to prevent wars. “I’ve seen and done things I want to forget,” she chirps from afar, before laying out a grisly litany. “I’ve seen soldiers fall like lumps of meat, blown and shot out beyond belief. Arms and legs were in the trees… Flies swarming everyone. Over the whole summit peak flesh quivering in the heat. This was something else again. I fear I cannot explain.” And as words begin to fail her, a man starts singing “What if I take my problem to the United Nations…?” over lap-steel evoking the theme from High Noon. In the face of such horrors, the UN is a punchline.

The other highlights of the record follow quickly one upon the other. “The Glorious Land” sounds a distant-sounding off-tempo and off-key bugle call at various points throughout the song, adding that ineffable disquiet with which Harvey is so adept at imbuing her work. The soaring vocals which open “On Battleship Hill” evoke the winds sweeping that old Gallipoli battlefield 80 years later, as “the land returns to how it has always been.” And it’s difficult not to shiver when she hides “our young men… with guns, in the dirt and in the dark places.”

None of the songs are celebratory of war—there’s a profound sadness undergirding everything, a sense of tragedy and loss. But there’s also a resignation and acceptance that this story is an eternal component of the human experience, and that there’s a poignancy and beauty to be appreciated there. It’s as if the album is an extended rumination on Goya’s Fight with Cudgels from his famous Black Paintings: two men stand poised to club each other to death in a vast and beautiful field—because this is what men do.

Let England Shake shows that popular music is capable of making complete and satisfying statements on big and important matters without resorting to tired political cliché. If Harvey’s triumph is a harbinger of more outward-looking popular music to come, or if it serves as an inspiration to musicians to look past the laces of their own shoes, we’ll all be better off. But more likely (and more depressingly) P.J. Harvey may be another in a long line of Cassandras, her message ignored by a youth transfixed by their own navels.  Or worse still, in her own words, perhaps “indifference has won, won, won” and the slow death of our culture is assured.

Posted in Europe, Music | 8 Comments
December 30, 2010

Harvey Sicherman, June 2, 1945-December 25, 2010

A dear friend, colleague and mentor, Harvey Sicherman, passed away on the evening of December 25 after a fairly brief illness. Times like these make me struggle yet again with the apparent impossibility of reconciling the intensity of feeling we know deep down to be real and of enormous importance with the coldness of a large universe that speaks to us in anonymizing tones. But I know and trust what I feel to be important, and what I feel is a deep loss accompanied by a faint but persistent faith in its meaning.

I knew Harvey for more than 38 years, from a time sunk deep back in the mists, when he was nearly 27 and I was nearly 21 years of age. As several appreciations, including those by Dov Zakheim and John Hannah, have already noted, he was an extraordinary man: brilliant and incisive, creative and personable, learned and kind, stylish and an exuberant lover of life. A 1971 Penn Ph.D., he came to work in the world of universities, think-tanks and government. He served as a close aid to three Secretaries of State: Haig, Shultz and Baker. He is responsible, behind-the-scenes, not only for many memorable secretarial turns of phrase as a speechwriter in Policy Planning at the Sate Department, but also for several key policy directions those Secretaries took, from dealing with Saddam Hussein after the August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to the masterful diplomacy that accompanied the reunification of Germany.

Since leaving government and Washington some 15 years ago, Harvey was director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia. During these years we continued to work together, at FPRI and elsewhere. Harvey wrote brilliantly for The National Interest when I worked there, and even more brilliantly for The American Interest since it was founded in 2005. His final published essay, “For Richer, for Poorer”, appears in our November/December 2010 issue. But don’t miss, if you have not yet read it, his magisterial essay from May/June 2007, “Adventures in State-Building: Bremer’s Iraq and Cromer’s Egypt”, which I think remains the most insightful essay yet written on U.S. policymaking in the Iraq War.

Six years my elder, he served as a mentor to me during the many years we worked together, and as a mentor not only in professional life, but in all of life. We shared certain tastes—in humor, literature sacred and otherwise, old cars, fine whisky, sartorial punctuation and fountain pens—but he educated my tastes in all these domains and more. We shared more than that, too. I was with him during his father’s illness and passing; and he was with me, by my side, to bury my father. He attended my wedding; I attended the circumcision ceremonies of his sons and grandsons. I saw Harvey’s every mood—when he was, as ever, graceful, eloquent, charming and vivacious in public, but also when he was frustrated, worried, angry and tired in private.

From these experiences I know that Harvey was not only brilliant, creative and almost impossibly personable, but also wise. Many people may be said to be devoted, but not as many devoted to the right purposes. Harvey was: A perfectionist as an intellectual, he would not let fly in writing until he was sure he understood the material, had mastered its meaning, and took the necessary pains to express himself as clearly and carefully as possible. He cared about quality, not quantity, and he cared about making a positive difference, not pontificating for its own sake. He was, in short, the antithesis of the shoot-from-the-hip, naked-opinion-to-spite-learning style of the blogosphere.

In his insistence on doing things both well and for the right reasons, Harvey constantly elevated my understanding of what diligence in thought and expression is all about. He knew what was worth taking seriously, and he did. He knew how to have some fun, too, and he did that as well. Above all, however, he understood how to balance what was serious and what was fun because he also knew the difference between right and wrong, and never wavered from it.

It has been one of the greatest of honors in my life to have had Harvey as a friend and colleague, someone enough my elder to give me unfailingly good counsel over many years, but not so much so that he was unable to speak with me as an equal on matters of substance as we both grew older. He could talk and teach with the best, but he could also listen and learn from others–and to find someone capable of doing both is a great rarity in this world, in these days as in any. I miss him now, and I will miss him always.

(N.B.: I have written a more personal and longer reflection in my blog: thenewestdealer.blogspot.com.)

Posted in General | Leave a comment
December 20, 2010

Patently False

The email’s subject line was meant to be a grabber:  “Surprising results: Does the public support DNA patents?”

The link was to an article in the Biotechnology Industry Organization’s December newsletter about a “new survey that points to the general public’s support for patenting DNA-based products.”

Public support for patents on genes? That did sound surprising. For several years I’ve been following the news and online chatter about the ongoing lawsuit against Myriad Genetics, which holds—and jealously guards—patents on the “breast cancer genes.” The only support for human gene patents that I’ve run across has come from intellectual property lawyers and those who pay them. Everyone else seems to be against them: the ACLU, which is representing the plaintiffs in the Myriad case; the Department of Justice, which in October filed an amicus brief supporting the lawsuit’s core argument that genes are “products of nature” and therefore not patentable; Forbes, where the headline greeting the Justice Department’s move was “The Feds Come Out Against Gene Patents. It’s About Time.

So who did the industry trade group dig up? Well, according to BIO’s newsletter, the survey covered “400 elite voters,” people who make more than $75,000 a year, have college degrees, and “closely follow current events.”

Why restrict the opinion study to the wealthy and well-educated? Perhaps because BIO was hoping for a favorable response, but even the washed apparently have qualms about the gene patent giveaway of the past few decades: 51 percent of the survey respondents expressed “reservations” about patents “on DNA-based products” (the industry trade group term uses this term because it believes that the language everyone else uses, like “gene patents” and “human gene patents”, “produce the negative reactions”).

What does BIO make of the finding that, even in its select sample, many appear less than fully enamored of patenting the human genome? With little room for creative maneuver, BIO trumpets that the cautious 51 percent could be persuaded to shelve their reservations by telling them that gene patents “allow biotech companies to work on treatments and cures for often deadly diseases.” Is BIO taking the temperature of opinion leaders here, or looking to spread pro-patent fever?

The brief BIO article goes on to summarize its conclusions from the opinion study. “First and foremost,” it says, gene patent boosters should talk about “diseases that touch everyone . . . diabetes, Alzheimer’s, cancer and heart disease.”

In other words, spend lots of money on the message “no patents, no cures.” BIO’s president, former Pennsylvania Representative Jim Greenwood, who was also BIO’s 1998 “Legislator of the Year”, likes to add another message: “no patents,  no jobs.”

The second conclusion: “The industry must reassure the public that biotech is not the enemy.” Sounds like a tall order.

Marcy Darnovsky is associate executive director at the Center for Genetics and Society, a public affairs organization working to encourage responsible uses and effective societal governance of human biotechnologies, from a perspective grounded in social justice, human rights and health equity. Darnovsky was co-author, along with Jesse Reynolds, of “The Battle to Patent Your Genes: The Meaning of the Myriad Case”, in the September/October 2009 issue of The American Interest.

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November 24, 2010

North Korea’s Eternal Return

Yesterday’s North Korean attack on South Korea has evidently frightened many people. That’s natural, for there is some incalculable but not trivial prospect that the fighting could escalate into a huge bloody mess. The attack, and the South Korean response, seems to have led to an emergency National Security Council meeting from which the President “emerged”—that word is always used in these situations—to call his South Korean counterpart with words of steadfast reassurance and so forth. (What was really said, of practical import, the public thankfully does not know.) Whether it was wise to let existence of this meeting be known is questionable: The North Koreans love attention, and there is nothing to be gained by showing them that they have succeeded, yet again, in yanking our chain.

Were the President and his counselors frightened, too? Of course they would not say so, in so many words, but all the papers emphasized that no good choices for how to deal with the crisis were to be had. That suggests worry, or at the very least gives it a license to drive the emotions of the moment.

My reaction to North Korean thuggery was altogether different: I was really quite pleased.  This is not because my day job as a magazine editor means I have no line responsibilities to commute, so that I can therefore indulge without fear of retribution in a bout of I-told-you-so graveyard laughter. The North Koreans sink a South Korean naval vessel, killing more than 40 soldiers, and suffer not so much as a hangnail in response—and some are nevertheless surprised that they use violence again when it suits them. Light bends around such people.

No, not at all: I’m happy because every North Korean outrage of this sort advances the day when the Chinese government, the only human agency on the planet that can deal decisively with the dangers emanating from North Korea short of war, will realize that it needs to join with the United States, Japan and Russia to plot a modulated, controlled euthanasia for the North Korean regime. If it doesn’t, Beijing will be left essentially alone to deal with a war crisis and socio-economic collapse of much greater proportions.

Chinese attitudes have been changing slowly since 2002, the year that blatant North Korean cheating on the 1994 Agreed Framework came out into the open. The subsequent Six-Party Talks helped move them further along. What Pyongyang let loose yesterday, however, possibly in conjunction with some obscure inflection in North Korea’s mostly opaque political succession process, ought to quicken the pace a good bit.

Assuming it might, what should we do now?  I laid it all out more than eight years ago in The New Republic, and nothing that has happened since has changed my mind.

What I proposed then, and still stand by now, would take serious multilateral diplomacy, real determination, requisite skill and indomitable patience to pull off. The George W. Bush Administration did not have the right stuff for Korea. Does the Obama Administration?  No sign of that stuff yet.

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October 12, 2010

After the Other Shoe Drops

When the Supreme Court decided Citizens United v. FEC last fall, holding that corporations have a First Amendment right to spend money in candidate elections, analysts were divided over how much the case was going to affect U.S. elections.  Writing in the July/August issue of The American Interest (as part of its extensive coverage of the Citizens United decision) I took somewhat of a middle position:

But it is easier to understate the importance of the case. First, it has become apparent that corporations and trade associations, such as the Chamber of Commerce, now feel as though a cloud has been lifted on their election-related activities. What was of questionable legality before is clearly legal now. Full-blown corporate involvement in Federal elections likely awaits the striking down of rules prohibiting corporations from making contributions to independent expenditure committees, so that corporations will not risk losing their customers by identifying with one side or the other in a candidate election. They will hide behind groups with innocuous names like “Americans for a Strong America” and other such anodyne labels.

When I wrote those words, I did not expect the other shoe to drop as quickly as it did.  Three significant post-Citizens United rulings, as well as the continued intense partisanship of our elections, have contributed to the precipitous decline in our campaign finance laws.  First, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held in the SpeechNow.org case that individual human beings have a constitutional right to contribute directly to political committees that make only independent expenditures.  Eliza Newlin Carney has dubbed these independent expenditure-only committees “Super PACs.”  The theory of SpeechNow.org is that if independent spending cannot corrupt, contributions to fund such independent spending cannot corrupt either.

The Federal Election Commission, with a single sentence of constitutional analysis, followed up on SpeechNow.org by granting the right of corporations and labor unions to make unlimited contributions to super-PACs.  (Disclosure: I am representing the City of San Diego in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit arguing that similar limitations in the City’s law remain constitutional.)

Finally, the FEC split 3-3 along party lines on the question of what needs to be disclosed when groups broadcast television and radio ads mentioning federal candidates close to the elections.  The three Republican Commissioners have taken the position that virtually nothing needs to be disclosed about contributions to fund these ads.

Groups quickly have become emboldened by these rulings, especially those that are using the 501(c)(4) tax status, which allows for shielding even more contributions from public disclosure.  This of course has the potential to undermine confidence in the electoral process, with Democrats raising the specter (thus far, no more than a specter) of foreign money influencing our elections.

It does not have to be so.  Citizens United actually endorsed the idea of quick and full Internet disclosure of money going in and out of campaigns.  But attempts to fix the disclosure rules got mired in partisan controversy this past fall, and no one seems ready to subject political groups to random audits, which seems to be the only way to assure that foreign money doesn’t make it into our campaigns.

The rules continue to be in flux, and the real test will come in 2012.  Remember that President Obama raised $785 million of mostly disclosed money under the old rules.  What will the future look like?  I don’t expect it to be pretty.

Richard L. Hasen is the William H. Hannon Distinguished Professor of Law at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.

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September 16, 2010

More Nobel Wisdom from Jimmy Carter

In today’s New York Times, former President Jimmy Carter tells us that the North Korean regime is ready for a deal.  Should we believe him? We don’t have to answer on the basis of mere supposition. There is some history here.

On June 22, 1994, after Carter’s return from Pyongyang carrying what became known as the Agreed Framework, he was interviewed on CNN by Judy Woodruff. Here is an excerpt from that conversation:

Jimmy Carter: . . .what the North Koreans were waiting for was some treatment of their exalted leader with respect and a direct communication. . . .I think he was quite ready. I didn’t have to argue with him. When I outlined the specific points that I had been informed in Washington was the administration’s policy.  . . . with very little equivocation he agreed. . . . I think it’s all roses now. . . . I’ve known that there were people in Washington who were skeptical about any direct dealing with the North Koreans. They were already condemned as outlaws. Kin Il-sung was already condemned as a criminal. . . . And it was kind of a miracle and almost an incredible statement that Kim Il-sung gave me in response to my proposals, and it was hard to believe. . . .

Judy Woodruff: Are you absolutely persuaded that the North Koreans are going to honor this agreement, that while the talks are going on that it’s not just a matter of buying time on the part of the North Koreans, that they will not secretly pursue the program they were pursuing earlier, the nuclear program?

Jimmy Carter: Judy, I’m convinced. But I said this when I got back from North Korea, and people said that I was naïve or gullible and so forth. I don’t think I was. In my opinion, this was one of those perfect agreements where both sides won and got what they wanted and there were no—nobody blinked, nobody had to yield. . . . I think the most important lesson is that we should not ever avoid direct talks, direct conversations, direct discussions and negotiations with the main person in a despised or misunderstood or condemned society who could actually resolve the issue. And we went through this for ten years when nobody in our government would meet or talk with Yasser Arafat. The Norwegians did, and they were the ones that brought the peace agreement last summer. . . .

I think this blast from the past speaks for itself. Obviously, the extent to which Carter was wrong in June 1994, about both North Korea and Yasser Arafat, is nothing short of breathtaking. The North Koreans did cheat, big time, and there was no Israeli-Palestinian “peace agreement”, only a framework for negotiations that ultimately failed.

One has to hand it to Carter: He is consistent.  One also has to hand it to the New York Times; it is, too.

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September 7, 2010

Corruption in Afghanistan

Barry Gewen, who wrote an excellent essay probing the nature of war crimes in our pages several years ago, penned a thought-piece on corruption over at Lawrence Kaplan’s Entanglements the other day. People are complaining about the dreadful amount of corruption in Afghanistan, Mr. Gewen notes, but the idealistic critics don’t know what they’re talking about. He proceeds to argue by analogy:

I’m told that if you want to buy a house in Italy, you had better know whom you have to pay off. That’s probably true in at least 50 countries around the world, and I’m willing to bet that Afghanistan is one of them. I’m equally sure that the tribal chiefs who are our allies against the Taliban maintain their positions through a system of patronage and payoffs. How can I be so sure? Not because I’m an expert on the ethnic communities of Afghanistan, but because I know something about American history.

Corruption is nothing new, Mr. Gewen contends. In Andrew Jackson’s time patronage networks were the norm, and this kind of “honest graft” still goes on in some of our larger cities. He cites Richard Hofstadter as saying that “single-minded concern for honesty in public service is a luxury of the middle and upper classes” and concludes that “Washington’s current fight against corruption is mainly about American, not Afghan, hearts and minds.” I share Mr. Gewen’s skepticism towards the preening commentariat, and I welcome his argument as far as it goes. Unfortunately, I’m afraid it doesn’t go nearly far enough.

At root of our current confusion is the nebulousness of the concept of “corruption” itself. Like “love”, it’s one of those words in the English language so broadly defined that it nearly confounds meaning. We love ice cream, children, roller-coasters, our country, and our husbands or wives. Similarly, from a manager choosing to promote her most servile underling over a more qualified candidate, to a board chairman appointing his son as the CEO; from a wealth management firm wining and dining a potential client, to an elaborate kickback scheme for Congressmen in charge of defense acquisitions; and from an accountant cooking the books, to complicated money laundering operations using offshore jurisdictions—it’s all corruption. We of course have recourse to subordinate terms: “nepotism,” “bribery,” and “theft” spring immediately to mind. But all too often we reach for the umbrella term, especially as a cudgel.

To complicate things further, even our shared understandings of corruption are strongly culturally bounded. As Lawrence Rosen argued in our pages a few months ago, only two of my above six examples would be considered evidence of corruption in large parts of the Muslim world. Especially in tribal cultures, society is understood as a dense web of reciprocal obligations established by individuals in the course of their lifetime. Corruption, therefore, is when someone you’ve done something for refuses to return the favor when he is in a position to do so. Much of the local grousing about corruption in a place like Afghanistan has to do with modernity upending these traditional dynamics. Indeed, one could imagine a Kabul-appointed governor in the provinces refusing local bribes as we’d expect, only to gain the enmity of the people for his probity.

Now a certain level of bribery and skimming may very well be the cost of doing business, especially in an underdeveloped place like Afghanistan. But can we countenance large-scale theft where hundreds of millions of aid dollars are funneled offshore by kleptocratic elites? As Felix Salmon clearly highlights, the line between the two types of corruption seems impossibly difficult to draw. He cites Stephen Biddle (also an AI author) musing about the necessity of working within existing Afghan patronage networks, and juxtaposes this with the angry remarks of former regulator Bill Black who is incensed over the developing mess over Kabul Bank. Mr. Salmon sides with Mr. Black, suggesting that this must all be a question of poor oversight and misplaced priorities.

I’m not quite so sure. Mr. Biddle and Mr. Black are really talking past each other, mostly because their arguments prevent them from taking a step back and contemplating the larger policy mistakes which shape the entire situation. Yes, it is probably impossible to dial in just the right amount of corruption—somewhere between bribery and graft—which would ensure a smooth-functioning government in Afghanistan. But it’s equally foolhardy to assume that if only we had kept our eye on the ball, we could’ve prevented something like Kabul Bank from happening in the first place.

The situation we find ourselves in is the result of two policy decisions we made in the aftermath of our invasion: we chose to create a strong central government in a country that hasn’t had one in over 100 years; and we decided to try to transform the country in short order by pouring billions of dollars into it. Had we opted for a strategy of confederating various local warlords and strongmen, the resultant corruption would have been more diffuse. Even if the same percentage of aid money was being skimmed off the top, these abuses would have been more acceptable to your average Afghan who would benefit directly from the warlord’s local patronage network. Instead, we’re funneling all our money through President Karzai’s network and are surprised that those left out of the loop are complaining bitterly.

And even if President Karzai was some kind of saintly figure who resisted the temptation of enriching himself, and who could furthermore force his entire clan to do the same, there’s a real question of whether a country whose GDP was $4 billion in 2003 could reasonably hope to absorb the largesse the world’s development agencies are lavishing upon it like a torrential downpour on parched earth. In these kinds of circumstances, massive graft is almost a given.

So back to Barry Gewen: he is basically correct to say that there’s no alternative to using patronage networks in Afghanistan. In a tribal society, that’s just how things work, and the skimming that happens in these situations really is a cost of doing business—arguments to the contrary are dangerously idealistic. But he’s wrong to be so glib about corruption in general, to shrug his shoulders and to affirm that our policy choices are the right ones. In fact they have been disastrously wrong and have greatly multiplied our difficulties.

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