Below is the program for the event. If you’re interested in attending, please RSVP directly to clemons@newamerica.net. Media Inquiries, contact Kate Brown at 202-986-2700 or brown@newamerica.net.

The New America Foundation and The American Interest
cordially invite you and your colleagues to a public policy forum

PRESIDENT OBAMA ONE YEAR ON:
A DISCUSSION WITH ESSAYISTS FROM THE AMERICAN INTEREST
For essays from the special year-end issue of The American Interest, click here.

WALTER RUSSELL MEAD
Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy, Council on Foreign Relations
Essay:  ”Consider Lincoln”

RICHARD PERLE
Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute
Essay: “The Open Hand, Slapped”

G. JOHN IKENBERRY (via video skype)
Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs
Woodrow Wilson School of Public & International Affairs, Princeton University
Essay: “The Right Grand Strategy”

STEVE CLEMONS
Director, American Strategy Program, New America Foundation
Publisher, The Washington Note
Essay: “No Breakthrough”

WILL MARSHALL
President and Founder, Progressive Policy Institute
Essay: “Big Bite, Tough Chew”

Stage Setting Remarks:
ADAM GARFINKLE
Editor, The American Interest

Moderator:
STEVE COLL
President, New America Foundation
Staff Writer, The New Yorker

Tuesday, 22 December 2009
12:15 pm – 1:45 pm
New America Foundation
1899 L Street NW, 4th Floor — Washington, DC

First, in the New York Times “Week in Review” section under the headline “Our Decade of Deluded Thinking,” an unsigned author makes some astonishing comments, one astonishingly good but most astonishingly bad. First the good: the article admits that Mossadegh did not fall in 1953 owing mainly to the intrigues of U.S. intelligence. That’s of course right, and the same can be rightly said about Allende in Chile in the early 1970s. It’s nice to see this in the NYT, and it may come in handy one day when the common reverse view shows up there, as it certainly will. But the piece starts, “It is not often that large-scale crises are due to intellectual error…” Oh yes they are: They are more than often so; they are almost invariably so. Thus Auguste Comte: “Intellectual confusion is at the bottom of every historical crisis.” Score one for Comte; the NYT is wrong. And last, at the bottom of the second paragraph, Francis Fukuyama is once again, for the umpteenth time, vulgarized into holding the view, twenty years ago, of the very modernization theorists with whom he has always disagreed—that all modernization is of a piece and leads to Westernization. That’s not what he meant by the phrase “end of history”, but it’s his own fault for using a philosophical concept and expecting that most people—journalists certainly not excepted—would ever understand what he meant. If a typical Washington-beat journalists ever sits down and actually reads Hegel, I am sure the world will suddenly come to an end. But I am not worried about that happening

Second, Joshua Kurlantzick, in the “Outlook” section of the Washington Post, front page, under the title “A Nobel Winner who went wrong on rights,” takes the President to task for deemphasizing democracy and human rights. He contrasts the Nobel speech, the best speech by far the Preisdent has given while in office, with the Administration’s prior policy choices, as best he can make them out. The Administration is right; Kurlantzick, and all the other people who like to wear human rights on their sleeves—and who have no understanding at all of Samuel Huntington’s “democracy paradox”—are wrong. The best way to advance human rights and democracy is slowly, steadily, in the context of other dimensions of policy, and with full understanding of the opportunities and limits afforded by political culture. It is not by sounding like the mother-in-law of the world. And it is not by presuming the ridiculous argument that realism and its interests—like preventive mass violence, preserving civil and interstate order and the principles that order enables to become reality, and so forth—have no moral implcations. The President was channeling Reinhold Niehbur in Oslo. He could do a lot worse, and Kurlantzick should do some reading.

Third, Ed Begley’s new book, Why the Dreyfus Affair Matters (Yale), reviewed in this week’s New York Times Book Review, carries a thesis that sounds very much overstated but that is, in any case, not original: that the sins of the French government against Dreyfus resembled the “crimes” of the George W. Bush Administration. I can prove it isn’t original. Just read the AI essay by the historian Paul Schroeder, “Mirror, Mirror on the War,” Spring 2006—that’s more than three years ago. I commissioned that essay, and while I do not agree with parts of it (and did not at the time, either), I think it’s a brilliant essay. I wonder if Begley’s book is as good. Naturally, I also wonder, but cannot expect to ever find out, where he got his idea.

In the January-February 2007 issue of The American Interest, Stern, along with co-author William Antholis, proposed the creation of an environmental E-8 to parallel the existing, economics-focused G-8.

Once you get past the soaring rhetoric, however, there are some serious problems with the underlying policy assumptions.

I’ve taken the liberty of annotating a full text copy of the speech and posting it here. I’ve highlighted certain phrases and passages, and if you mouse over them my annotation will pop up in a gray box. While some of my gripes are stylistic, others are substantive. I think it’s a good exercise to go through a speech like this carefully, line-by-line. It focuses the mind on the matters being discussed in a way that merely talking about it doesn’t.

* * *

President Barack Obama’s speech of 1 December 2009, delivered at West Point

Good evening. To the United States Corps of Cadets, to the men and women of our armed services, and to my fellow Americans: I want to speak to you tonight about our effort in Afghanistan—the nature of our commitment there, the scope of our interests, and the strategy that my Administration will pursue to bring this war to a successful conclusion.Note the absence of the word victory anywhere in this speech. To some, this is a flaw, because that is what the U.S. military fights to achieve, and without a sense that the Command-in-Chief seeks victory and is dedicated to achieving it, morale flags. To others, this is a virtue, because no reasonable definition of victory is achievable at reasonable cost and in a reasonable and politically sustainable timeframe in Afghanistan. Better not to raise expectations that cannot be met. I am of the latter view. It is an honor for me to do so here—at West Point—where so many men and women have prepared to stand up for our security, and to represent what is finest about our country.Amen, and well said.

To address these issues, it is important to recall why America and our alliesAwkward: America and its allies, or we and our allies—but not America and our allies. were compelled to fight a war in Afghanistan in the first place. We did not ask for this fight. On September 11, 2001, nineteen men hijacked four airplanes and used them to murder nearly 3,000 people. They struck at our military and economic nerve centers. They took the lives of innocent men, women, and children without regard to their faith or race or station.That’s not exactly true: They were trying quite explicitly to kill Jews and “Crusaders”, namely Christians. Were it not for the heroic actions of the passengers on board one of those flights, they could have also struck at one of the great symbols of our democracy in Washington, and killed many more.Amen.

As we know, these men belonged to al Qaeda—a group of extremists who have distorted and defiled Islam,This is true: the way al-Qaeda interprets Islam is very heterodox; indeed, it is a heterodoxy within a heterodoxy. But it is misleading to suggest that there are not precedents in Islam for this point of view, going all the way back to Ibn Tamiyya in the 13th century. It is also misleading to suggest that al-Qaeda does not have significant support in Arab societies as a protest movement, even if people do not accept its theology. one of the world’s great religions, to justify the slaughter of innocents. Al Qaeda’s base of operations was in Afghanistan, where they were harbored by the TalibanPassive voice—awkward.—a ruthless, repressive and radical movement that seized control of that country after it was ravaged by years of Soviet occupation and civil war, and after the attention of America and our friends had turned elsewhere.This is true, but it suggests a criticism of earlier Presidents and administrations. I continue to believe that this is bad form, and is un-presidential. It is especially so when uttered in an Arab country, as the President did in Cairo. To criticize one’s own “tribe” in a host’s land is seen as debasing and indicative of a lack of integrity; it is fawning and it demeans the speaker in the eyes of the host. It is a culturally illiterate thing to do.

Just days after 9/11, Congress authorized the use of force against al Qaeda and those who harbored them—an authorization that continues to this day. The vote in the Senate was 98 to 0. The vote in the House was 420 to 1. For the first time in its history, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization invoked Article 5—the commitment that says an attack on one member nation is an attack on all. And the United Nations Security Council endorsed the use of all necessary steps to respond to the 9/11 attacks. America, our allies and the world were acting as one to destroy al Qaeda’s terrorist network, and to protect our common security.

Under the banner of this domestic unity and international legitimacy—and only after the Taliban refused to turn over Osama bin Laden—we sent our troops into Afghanistan. Within a matter of months, al Qaeda was scattered and many of its operatives were killed. The Taliban was driven from power and pushed back on its heels. A place that had known decades of fear now had reason to hope. At a conference convened by the UN, a provisional government was established under President Hamid Karzai. And an International Security Assistance Force was established to help bring a lasting peace to a war-torn country.Two consecutive uses of passive voice, but excusable here to some extent.

Then, in early 2003, the decision was madeMore passive voice, but its purpose is obvious and fully justified here. to wage a second war in Iraq. The wrenching debate over the Iraq War is well-knownSmall grammatical error in the text: should be “well known” here, not “well-known”, which works for an adjectival phrase. and need not be repeated here.“Need not”? He means it would be stupid to, because the President knows he must depend on the GOP to support his decision, since so many Democrats won’t. It is enough to say that for the next six years, the Iraq War drew the dominant share of our troops, our resources, our diplomacy, and our national attention—and that the decision to go into Iraq caused substantial rifts between America and much of the world.

Today, after extraordinary costs, we are bringing the Iraq war to a responsible end.What the President does not say is that the unpopular but ultimately effective “surge” in Iraq ordered by President Bush has created a situation in which a responsible, non-crisis mode management of Iraq is possible. President Obama can decide as he wishes in Afghanistan because a decision he opposed while in the Senate worked. He is now proposing his own “surge” in Afghanistan, and elsewhere in this summation of events he is aligning himself with the previous administration’s basic views. This is rich with irony, for those who like and can appreciate it. We will remove our combat brigades from Iraq by the end of next summer, and all of our troops by the end of 2011.An unwise comment, in my view: better to have added “. . .by the end of 2011, if the progress that has been made can be sustained and deepened.” And it would have been nice to have heard just one more sentence here pledging close attention and determination to see the mission in Iraq through to an acceptable conclusion. It won’t happen all by itself, and it would be tragic if we took our eye off the ball at just the wrong time—a kind of reverse error of having taken our eye off Afghanistan in 2003. That we are doing so is a testament to the character of our men and women in uniform. Thanks to their courage, grit and perseverance, we have given Iraqis a chance to shape their future,Should say “their own future”—sounds better. and we are successfully leaving Iraq to its people.Yes, courageous but, as I just said, we owe it, and he owes it, to President Bush’s courage as well—something he would never say, and which is also in my view un-presidential in character.

But while we have achieved hard-earned milestones in Iraq, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated. After escaping across the border into Pakistan in 2001 and 2002, al Qaeda’s leadership established a safe-haven there. Although a legitimate government was elected by the Afghan people,Passive voice; bad writing. it has been hampered by corruption,The U.S. government, this administration included, appears to be unaware that different cultures view corruption differently. We will return to this critical matter below. the drug trade,The drug trade is not a separate item from corruption; it is the expression of it. an under-developed economy, and insufficient Security Forces. Over the last several years,He should have said “past” several years. the Taliban has maintained common cause with al Qaeda, as they both seek an overthrow of the Afghan government. Gradually, the Taliban has begun to take control over swaths of Afghanistan, while engaging in increasingly brazen and devastating acts of terrorism against the Pakistani people.There is an elision here: The attacks in Pakistan have been carried out for the most part by Taliban-type groups inside Pakistan, not by the Afghan Taliban. It is a mistake to conflate Taliban in Pakistan with those in Afghanistan, and it is a mistake to see the Taliban in Afghanistan as a monad. This is a Pashtun tribal affair, where patrimonial segmentary lineages play a greater role in establishing affinities than religion or ideology in a broad sense. This statement suggests cultural illiteracy too.

Throughout this period, our troop levels in Afghanistan remained a fraction of what they were in Iraq. When I took office, we had just over 32,000 Americans serving in Afghanistan, compared to 160,000 in Iraq at the peak of the war. Commanders in Afghanistan repeatedly asked for support to deal with the reemergence of the Taliban, but these reinforcements did not arrive.This is true. The one who truly “dithered” in Afghanistan, failing to articulate a theory of victory or a means of withdrawal, was George W. Bush. That’s why, shortly after taking office, I approved a long-standing request for more troops. After consultations with our allies, I then announced a strategy recognizing the fundamental connection between our war effort in Afghanistan, and the extremist safe-havens in Pakistan.Credit where credit is due: This was a major intellectual and analytical step forward. I set a goal that was narrowly defined as disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda and its extremist allies, and pledged to better coordinate our military and civilian effort.To better integrate the civilian and military effort was also a great step forward, but it has proved very hard to do. However, to see the al-Qaeda problem as geographically focused on the Afghan-Pak border is shortsighted. The enemy is ultimately an idea, and the idea can alight in lots of places—Somalia and Yemen, to cite just two relevant examples, which, to be fair, Obama mentions later on in the speech.

Since then, we have made progress on some important objectives. High-ranking al Qaeda and Taliban leaders have been killed, and we have stepped up the pressure on al Qaeda world-wideWorldwide is one word.. In Pakistan, that nation’s Army has gone on its largest offensive in years. In Afghanistan, we and our allies prevented the Taliban from stopping a presidential election, and—although it was marred by fraud—that election produced a government that is consistent with Afghanistan’s laws and Constitution.

Yet huge challenges remain. Afghanistan is not lost, but for several years it has moved backwards. There is no imminent threat of the government being overthrown,I hope you do not have to eat those words, Mr. President. I am not so sure, and I would expect a major attack on Kabul within the next three to four month, now that you’ve told the Taliban how many more soldiers are on their way, but before they can get there and dig in. AFTERNOTE, DEC. 16, 2009: Yesterday’s major bomb explosion in Kabul is no surprise to me: It is both a probe and a foretaste of more to come in my view. AFTERNOTE, JAN. 3, 2010: I think the attack on the CIA station in Khost falls into the same category, except that it tracks with the counter-terrorist, not the counterinsurgency, dimension of U.S. intelligence operations in Afghanistan. AFTERNOTE, JAN. 19, 2010; yesterday’s brazen attack in Kabul, more of same. Told you so. but the Taliban has gained momentum. Al Qaeda has not reemerged in Afghanistan in the same numbers as before 9/11, but they retain their safe-havens along the border. And our forces lack the full support they need to effectively train and partner with Afghan Security Forces and better secure the population. Our new Commander in Afghanistan—General McChrystalThe President should have stated General McChrystal’s first name and, more important, I think he should have made respectful reference to General McKiernan and those who served under his command. It was an error of tact to omit this, and will cause hard feelings in the uniformed services that could have been avoided.—has reported that the security situation is more serious than he anticipated. In short: the status quo is not sustainable.

As cadets, you volunteered for service during this time of danger. Some of you have fought in Afghanistan. Many will deploy there. As your Commander-in-Chief, I owe you a mission that is clearly defined, and worthy of your service. That is why, after the Afghan voting was completed, I insisted on a thorough review of our strategy.Fails to mention that he had already ordered an earlier review. The President seems to be suggesting that the screwed up election was in his mind a major turning point. If so, that is odd in several ways. First, the election did not matter nearly as much to Afghans as it seems to have mattered to us. If we expected a different kind of election, we were naïve—again, an indication of cultural illiteracy. There is some backstory here, possibly involving the push and pull of personalities (Biden and Holbrooke among them) that we do not know about which explains this. Has to be. It may come out in memoirs later. The admission is also odd, second, in the sense that we have really screwed our relations with the victor of that election, Hamid Karzai. The administration essentially accused Karzai of every political sin under the sun in an effort to torque him, and now we have to deal with him likely for some years to come. This is a really stupid way to deal with subordinate foreign associates. If we thought him irredeemable, then we could have exerted ourselves to get rid of him, risky as that sort of thing always is (we remember Diem, of course). If we thought or think him irredeemable and we can’t or won’t get rid of him, we need to leave, because we cannot win a counterinsurgency with a local ally unable to win the loyalty of the population. If we think him reformable, then why lambaste him publicly? There is no good face to put on how the administration has handled Karzai so far. We insist that we be able to speak the truth publicly, but we excoriate him when he does the same—like when he points out that our pouring billions of dollars into a country that cannot absorb it is a major contributor to what we define as corruption. He is, of course, entirely correct. AFTERNOTE: April 2010. This has only gotten much worse, climaxed by a 25-minute Presidential visit to yell at Karzai in his own palace on March 28. It is hard to think of a dumber thing to have done—for the President himself to have gone and, in the eyes of the whole region, insulted Karzai. You don’t even finish the first cup of tea in that part of the world in 25 minutes. It’s hard to see what wad one has left to shoot after that. A few days later the White House averred that maybe it had miscalculated—itself an amazing thing to say in public. But that does not fix anything. Let me be clear: there has never been an option before me that called for troop deployments before 2010, so there has been no delay or denial of resources necessary for the conduct of the war.A dubious contention. If the situation is deteriorating, why wait to reverse it? You’re Commander-in-Chief: You could have demanded such a pre-2010 option ten months ago. Instead, the review has allowed me ask the hard questions, and to explore all of the different options along with my national security team, our military and civilian leadership in Afghanistan, and with our key partners. Given the stakes involved, I owed the American people—and our troops—no less.

This review is now complete. And as Commander-in-Chief, I have determined that it is in our vital national interest to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. After 18 months, our troops will begin to come home. These are the resources that we need to seize the initiative, while building the Afghan capacity that can allow for a responsible transition of our forces out of Afghanistan.This is a key paragraph in the speech, and it is muddled. The President is giving General McChrystal three-quarters of what he asked for, with no explanation of why, and his emphasis is not on what they will do but when they will begin to leave. He can (and did) qualify all he likes, but the message both to the enemy and to the Pakistani elite is that we are not committed to the fight long term, that we are seeking a “decent interval”, Frank Sneep style, and that the language the President used about Iraq—that we are leaving Iraq to Iraqis—he means also to use in speaking about Afghans before very long. The result: The Taliban will wait 18 months until we’re gone and then take over the country; and the Pakistani army and intelligence will in no way abandon ties with the Taliban, whom they see as a key to Pakistan’s strategic depth against India in Afghanistan. In this sense, what the President said is the functional equivalent of Lyndon Johnson’s speech of March 31, 1968. If you’re too young to remember that, go look it up.

I do not make this decision lightly. I opposed the war in Iraq precisely because I believe that we must exercise restraint in the use of military force, and always consider the long-term consequences of our actions.An excellent statement, one with which I concur fully. We have been at war for eight years, at enormous cost in lives and resources. Years of debate over Iraq and terrorism have left our unity on national security issues in tatters, and created a highly polarized and partisan backdrop for this effort.Yes, Mr. President, but you helped cause the divisions, while your Vice-President, for all of his frailties, did not: As I said a moment ago, you are a major beneficiary of the Iraq surge that you opposed. And having just experienced the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, the American people are understandably focused on rebuilding our economy and putting people to work here at home.A real jumble of a paragraph, which could be discussed at some length. But its overall impact is to reinforce the impression that we want to leave, because these wars are divisive—in this case critically within the Democratic Party—and we need to attend to the homefront. This paragraph no doubt touched off genuine smiles on the faces of those enemies hold up in the caves of Waziristan, people who know in their bones what protracted conflict and attrition really mean.

Most of all, I know that this decision asks even more of you—a military that, along with your families, has already borne the heaviest of all burdens. As President, I have signed a letter of condolence to the family of each American who gives their life in these wars. I have read the letters from the parents and spouses of those who deployed. I have visited our courageous wounded warriors at Walter Reed. I have travelledNot the preferred spelling of this word. to Dover to meet the flag-draped caskets of 18 Americans returning home to their final resting place. I see firsthand the terrible wages of war.A preposterous remark, but one that I am sure the President actually believes. If I did not think that the security of the United States and the safety of the American people were at stake in Afghanistan, I would gladly order every single one of our troops home tomorrow.A fair statement, but again one that shows where his gut is: He wants out, he does not want to be a war president. And it leaves open the interpretation that he wants out not just for sensible strategic reasons, like being able to face an even more dangerous problem ahead, that of an Iranian nuclear breakout, with all assets to hand—something he can’t have if we are still in combat in Afghanistan two or three years from now. It leaves open the interpretation that he wants to run for re-election without a war going on. It leaves open the interpretation, in other words, that the decision is a politically selfish one, not one really focused on America’s vital national interests. That may be an unfair interpretation, but it’s not an implausible one.

So no—I do not make this decision lightly. I make this decision because I am convinced that our security is at stake in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is the epicenter of the violent extremism practiced by al Qaeda. It is from here that we were attacked on 9/11, and it is from here that new attacks are being plotted as I speak. This is no idle danger; no hypothetical threat. In the last few months alone, we have apprehended extremists within our borders who were sent here from the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan to commit new acts of terror.This is the most intriguing statement in the entire speech. I have no idea what he is referring to—possibly an attempted November 17 hijacking of an AirTran flight from Atlanta to Houston, that the media seems to have mainly ignored. This danger will only grow if the region slides backwards, and al Qaeda can operate with impunity.Yes, but exactly the same argument can be made with respect to Iraq, which the President pays almost no attention to, or so it seems. We must keep the pressure on al Qaeda, and to do that, we must increase the stability and capacity of our partners in the region.

Of course, this burden is not ours alone to bear. This is not just America’s war. Since 9/11, al Qaeda’s safe-havens have been the source of attacks against London and Amman and Bali.He is right not to have mentioned Madrid, because that was homegrown. But why did he leave out the attacks in Morocco? The people and governments of both Afghanistan and Pakistan are endangered. And the stakes are even higher within a nuclear-armed Pakistan, because we know that al Qaeda and other extremists seek nuclear weapons, and we have every reason to believe that they would use them.Not so clear-cut as he makes it seem. There are fierce disputes among clergy that al-Qaeda respects as to the morality of nuclear weapons, and it’s not so easy to steal, transport and detonate a nuke. Still, it’s a statement I can live with.

These facts compel us to act along with our friends and allies. Our overarching goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.

To meet that goal, we will pursue the following objectives within Afghanistan. We must deny al Qaeda a safe-haven. We must reverse the Taliban’s momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government. And we must strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan’s Security Forces and government, so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan’s future.An excellent, clear summary of the mission.

We will meet these objectives in three ways. First, we will pursue a military strategy that will break the Taliban’s momentum and increase Afghanistan’s capacity over the next 18 months.This is preposterous. The idea that just 30,000 new troops, who won’t even get there until the end of summer, can turn the military tide in just one year is fantasy.

The 30,000 additional troops that I am announcing tonight will deploy in the first part of 2010—the fastest pace possible—so that they can target the insurgency and secure key population centers.Indicates an urban focus, and the abandonment of a broader nation/state-building effort, which is reinforced by later statements. Fine; but this contradicts the statement below that our efforts will focus on agricultural development—presumably to reduce poppy cultivation. If you cannot provide security in the countryside, especially if you don’t even try, you cannot focus on agriculture. They will increase our ability to train competent Afghan Security Forces, and to partner with them so that more Afghans can get into the fight. And they will help create the conditions for the United States to transfer responsibility to the Afghans.This is extremely dubious on two counts. First, it is very hard to train people in such a short time, but more important, the whole notion misses the point: trained to do what for whom? You can teach someone how to shoot a gun; you cannot train loyalty—who he aims the gun at on whose behest. If the Karzai government does not attract the loyalty of the Pashtun tribes over that of the Taliban and its tribal associates, then it doesn’t matter how well-trained the soldiers are. This is ducking a key problem—one of five such key problems, of which more below.

Because this is an international effort, I have asked that our commitment be joined by contributions from our allies.LOL Some have already provided additional troops, and we are confident that there will be further contributions in the days and weeks ahead. Our friends have fought and bled and died alongside us in Afghanistan. Now, we must come together to end this war successfully. For what’s at stake is not simply a test of NATO’s credibilityThank Heaven he mentioned NATO at least once. It usually seems to be the farthest thing from his mind. Just by the way, it was a terrible idea to drag NATO into Afghanistan in the first place, for all sorts of reasons as I argued to no avail (and in writing) at the time—but that’s another story. —what’s at stake is the security of our Allies, and the common security of the world.

Taken together, these additional American and international troops will allow us to accelerate handing over responsibility to Afghan forces, and allow us to begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011. Just as we have done in Iraq, we will execute this transition responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground.OK, this phrase, “conditions on the ground”, can be used as a rationale later on to back away from this timetable if necessary. I am very glad the President said this. Presidents need to multiply their options. We will continue to advise and assist Afghanistan’s Security Forces to ensure that they can succeed over the long haul. But it will be clear to the Afghan government—and, more importantly, to the Afghan people—that they will ultimately be responsible for their own country.

Second, we will work with our partners, the UN, and the Afghan people to pursue a more effective civilian strategy, so that the government can take advantage of improved security.This subject is given very short shrift in the speech, and thus accords with the conclusion that we are essentially giving up on the nation/state-building mission. The President is essentially saying here, let the UN and others do it if they think they can.

This effort must be based on performance. The days of providing a blank check are over. President Karzai’s inauguration speech sent the right message about moving in a new direction. And going forward, we will be clear about what we expect from those who receive our assistance. We will support Afghan Ministries, Governors, and local leaders that combat corruption and deliver for the people. We expect those who are ineffective or corrupt to be held accountable.As noted above, this is pure cultural illiteracy. For an Afghan government to be not corrupt as we understand that concept is for it to be not an Afghan government. In a tribal society, corruption is defined as not sharing largesse with your kinsmen. There is no significant impersonal institutional authority in Afghanistan and there never has been. Afghanistan has never really had the characteristics of a modern state, because its tribal associational ties have been far too strong to have allowed the creation of one. This is a key misunderstanding and a critical one: the government in Kabul will never, at least in our lifetimes, achieve the standards of a European or Euro-American culture in this regard. It is fantasy to assume otherwise, and it is amazing to me, after all we’ve been through in Iraq (not to speak of Vietnam) that our political class still thinks that all cultures take the same view of abstract concepts like corruption, law, justice, dignity, rights and so on. This is willful ignorance. Did none of these people ever take an anthro course? And we will also focus our assistance in areas—such as agricultureAs noted, a contradiction with the urban security emphasis and hence another fantasy. —that can make an immediate impact in the lives of the Afghan people.

The people of Afghanistan have endured violence for decades. They have been confronted with occupation—by the Soviet Union, and then by foreign al Qaeda fighters who used Afghan land for their own purposes. So tonight, I want the Afghan people to understand—America seeks an end to this era of war and suffering. We have no interest in occupying your country. We will support efforts by the Afghan government to open the door to those Taliban who abandon violence and respect the human rights of their fellow citizens.Very interesting phrase, suggesting that we expect political flexibility on the part of the Afghan government, and if we don’t see it we reserve the right to withdraw support from the Afghan government. It suggests we expect a political resolution and compromise to end the war, not a military victory—again, the word victory is never mentioned. I think this is correct; I am not sure it was wise to put it in the speech. Sounds to me like the proper topic of a private conversation between Ambassdor Eikenberry and President Karzai in Kabul. And we will seek a partnership with Afghanistan grounded in mutual respect—to isolate those who destroy; to strengthen those who build; to hasten the day when our troops will leave; and to forge a lasting friendship in which America is your partner, and never your patron.Terrific rhetoric; brilliant. But it suggests the impossible: We leave but we’re still your partner. Sounds great, but it’s meaningless in practice to Afghans who have backed our horse. If they are closely associated with us and we leave, they will be slaughtered if the Taliban regain power—and they know it.

Third, we will act with the full recognition that our success in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to our partnership with Pakistan.

We are in Afghanistan to prevent a cancer from once again spreading through that country. But this same cancer has also taken root in the border region of Pakistan. That is why we need a strategy that works on both sides of the border.Well said—but this is easier to say than to do, by a lot.

In the past, there have been those in Pakistan who have argued that the struggle against extremism is not their fight, and that Pakistan is better off doing little or seeking accommodation with those who use violence. But in recent years, as innocents have been killed from Karachi to Islamabad, it has become clear that it is the Pakistani people who are the most endangered by extremism.Awkward writing. Public opinion has turned.This may or may not be so, but more important, elite opinion has not turned. The Army and the ISI still see the Taliban as an ally in escrow and Afghanistan as their strategic depth. I get the feeling most of the time that no one in high places in our government really understands the Pashtun demographic and tribal geometry that has defined Afghan-Pak relations since Pakistan came into existence. Once you understand this, and look at a map, it becomes pretty obvious why strategists in Pakistan are not about to give up trying to influence who rules in Kabul. They will always be there, and we will leave like other foreigners have left—and that is the indelible truth that they would be irresponsible to ignore. Why we can’t grasp that I just don’t understand. Look: You can’t persuade some people that you’re leaving and others that you’re staying at the same time. Not even a brilliant speechwriter (like me) can pull that off. The Pakistani Army has waged an offensive in Swat and South Waziristan. And there is no doubt that the United States and Pakistan share a common enemy.

In the past, we too often defined our relationship with Pakistan narrowly. Those days are over. Moving forward, we are committed to a partnership with Pakistan that is built on a foundation of mutual interests, mutual respect, and mutual trust. We will strengthen Pakistan’s capacity to target those groups that threaten our countries, and have made it clear that we cannot tolerate a safe-haven for terrorists whose location is known, and whose intentions are clear.OK, this is in effect a gauntlet thrown down: Pakistan must attack and undo the Quetta shura, where mullah Omar is likely holding war court. If I am right about the Pakistani elite’s conception of its own vital national interest, they will not do this–and we cannot make them. We shall see who’s right, and it won’t take long to find out. AFTERNOTE, DEC. 17, 2009: Today’s news focuses on the stonewalling by Pakistan in not giving visas to American personnel involved in the effort against the Taliban. This is just as I predicted, but more public and sooner than I expected to see it. We may shoot at the Quetta Shura ourselves—open a new fire box, as it were—but I doubt we can handle it from the air alone. If we attack it means we have concluded that the Pakistanis won’t. We shall see who’s right, and it won’t take all that long to find out. AFTERNOTE, Feb. 24, 2010: Well, if it’s true, as today’s Christian Science Monitor [http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2010/0224/Half-of-Afghanistan-Taliban-leadership-arrested-in-Pakistan] reports that the Pakistani crackdown on the Afghan Taliban is more widespread than thought, then maybe my prediction is wrong. The report claims that Pakistan has arrested seven out of 15 members of the Quetta Shura, including Mullah Baradar, the Taliban’s second-in-command and Mullah Abdul Qayyum Zakir, a major military strategist who was imprisoned in Guantanamo and released. But no: it turned out that the ISI arrested moderates who might have been willing to talk to Karzai, and who may in fact have been talking to Karzai, in order to take them out of play. The serious guys they left alone. AFTERNOTE: April 11, 2010: Note today’s Washington Post headline, “Pakistan released insurgents, officials say”, on page one under the bi-line of Greg Miller. That about says it all….until the next piece of evidence in support of my original contention. AFTERNOTE August 23, 2010: Today’s front page NYT story, on how the ISI picked up, “arrested”, a bunch of Taliban, notably Abdul Ghani Baradar, proves that this was done to stop Afghan-Taliban negotiations that threatened to leave Pakistan out in the cold, but were vital to extricating the U.S. from the mess with a political solution. It shows again, as I have insisted from the start, that the Pakistanis are not helping us; they care only about their own long-term circumstances—and why shouldn’t they?—but that puts them in conflict with us for the moment. I have always had this right, and fie on everyone who kept telling me, oh, the Paks are coming around to our point of view. Nonsense.
America is also providing substantial resources to support Pakistan’s democracy and development. We are the largest international supporter for those Pakistanis displaced by the fighting. And going forward, the Pakistani people must know: America will remain a strong supporter of Pakistan’s security and prosperity long after the guns have fallen silent, so that the great potential of its people can be unleashed.Again, a partnership without a presence is meaningless. We have left the Paks in the lurch before; everyone over there remembers it, and they simply don’t trust us not to do it again. This speech persuades those leaning toward that disposition to lean even further.

These are the three core elements of our strategy: a military effort to create the conditions for a transition; a civilian surge that reinforces positive action; and an effective partnership with Pakistan.

I recognize that there are a rangeGrammatical error: “is a range.” of concerns about our approach. So let me briefly address a few of the prominent arguments that I have heard, and which I take very seriously.

First, there are those who suggest that Afghanistan is another Vietnam. They argue that it cannot be stabilized, and we are better off cutting our losses and rapidly withdrawing. Yet this argument depends upon a false reading of history. There are real and major differences, no doubt about it. But…..but. But we have five serious problems in Afghanistan and they mirror problems that proved fatal in Vietnam. First, there is no enemy of the enemy who will carry water and do dirty work for us—as with the Anbar Awakening in Iraq. The Northern Alliance cannot be resuscitated and the Pashtun tribes don’t work that way. Second, there is a sanctuary across a border, in this case the Durand Line, that we cannot really get at, and the Pakistanis won’t. Third, we lack a local ally that can be a focus of loyalty and social-symbolic mobilization. Fourth, we lack the civilian ready reserve capabilities we need to implement our counterinsurgency strategy. And fifth, the administration lacks political support at home to stay the course for as long as it would be necessary to do so. No, Afghanistan is not Vietnam. But it sort of quacks in Vietnamese all the same. Unlike Vietnam, we are joined by a broad coalition of 43 nations that recognizes the legitimacy of our action. Unlike Vietnam, we are not facing a broad-based popular insurgency.Look at the order here: The President gives priority to international legal legitimacy; only after does he mention a key strategic factor. I think this may be revelatory. And most importantly, unlike Vietnam, the American people were viciously attacked from Afghanistan, and remain a target for those same extremists who are plotting along its border. To abandon this area now—and to rely only on efforts against al Qaeda from a distance—would significantly hamper our ability to keep the pressure on al Qaeda, and create an unacceptable risk of additional attacks on our homeland and our allies.

Second, there are those who acknowledge that we cannot leave Afghanistan in its current state, but suggest that we go forward with the troops that we have. But this would simply maintain a status quo in which we muddle through, and permit a slow deterioration of conditions there. It would ultimately prove more costly and prolong our stay in Afghanistan, because we would never be able to generate the conditions needed to train Afghan Security Forces and give them the space to take over.

Finally, there are those who oppose identifying a timeframe for our transition to Afghan responsibility. Indeed, some call for a more dramatic and open-ended escalation of our war effort—one that would commit us to a nation buildingPhrase needs an n-dash. project of up to a decade. I reject this course because it sets goals that are beyond what we can achieve at a reasonable cost, and what we need to achieve to secure our interests.I agree. And here he makes explicit what has been implicit in the speech to this point. Furthermore, the absence of a timeframe for transition would deny us any sense of urgency in working with the Afghan government. It must be clear that Afghans will have to take responsibility for their security, and that America has no interest in fighting an endless war in Afghanistan.Here is his rationale for setting a date: The Afghans won’t take us seriously otherwise. This is a tough problem and a really difficult choice. I think the President is right about the pressure on the Afghans. I think he’s wrong to think they can respond effectively even with a deadline staring them in the face. And I think he perhaps underestimates the effect of the deadline on the enemy and the Pakistanis. A very tough call, to be sure.

As President, I refuse to set goals that go beyond our responsibility, our means, our or interests.Beautiful statement; Walter Lippman would be proud; music to my ears. And I must weigh all of the challenges that our nation faces. I do not have the luxury of committing to just one. Indeed, I am mindful of the words of President Eisenhower, who—in discussing our national security—said, “Each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs.”Wonderful, lucid, terrific use of DDE. The President has reminded Americans what statecraft is—the conceptual union of domestic and foreign policy, and it is way past time that a President laid this out.

Over the past several years, we have lost that balance, and failed to appreciate the connection between our national security and our economy.Amen. In the wake of an economic crisis, too many of our friends and neighbors are out of work and struggle to pay the bills, and too many Americans are worried about the future facing our children. Meanwhile, competition within the global economy has grown more fierce.He means fiercer—usage error. So we simply cannot afford to ignore the price of these wars.Amen.

All told, by the time I took office the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan approached a trillion dollars. Going forward, I am committed to addressing these costs openly and honestly. Our new approach in Afghanistan is likely to cost us roughly 30 billion dollars for the military this year, and I will work closely with Congress to address these costs as we work to bring down our deficit.

But as we end the war in Iraq and transition to Afghan responsibility, we must rebuild our strength here at home. Our prosperity provides a foundation for our power. It pays for our military. It underwrites our diplomacy. It taps the potential of our people, and allows investment in new industry. And it will allow us to compete in this century as successfully as we did in the last. That is why our troop commitment in Afghanistan cannot be open-ended—because the nation that I am most interested in building is our own.Brilliant; some of the best Presidential prose in half a century, and conceptually unassailable. Sounds like he’s been reading The American Interest—James Kurth’s piece in the current issue and our “Nation-Building in America” sections that we’ve run for the past year based on precisely this insight.

Let me be clear: none of this will be easy. The struggle against violent extremism will not be finished quickly, and it extends well beyond Afghanistan and Pakistan.Yes, thank you. It will be an enduring test of our free society, and our leadership in the world. And unlike the great power conflicts and clear lines of division that defined the 20th century, our effort will involve disorderly regions and diffuse enemies.Elegantly said, and an important point for the American people to understand.

So as a result, America will have to show our strength in the way that we end wars and prevent conflict. We will have to be nimble and precise in our use of military power. Where al Qaeda and its allies attempt to establish a foothold—whether in Somalia or Yemen or elsewhere—they must be confronted by growing pressure and strong partnerships.

And we cannot count on military might alone. We have to invest in our homeland security, because we cannot capture or kill every violent extremist abroad. We have to improve and better coordinate our intelligence, so that we stay one step ahead of shadowy networks.

Nice—two fine paragraphs in a row.

We will have to take away the tools of mass destruction. That is why I have made it a central pillar of my foreign policy to secure loose nuclear materials from terrorists; to stop the spread of nuclear weapons; and to pursue the goal of a world without them. Because every nation must understand that true security will never come from an endless race for ever-more destructive weapons—true security will come for those who reject them.Nicely said, if utopian in character.

We will have to use diplomacy, because no one nation can meet the challenges of an interconnected world acting alone. I have spent this year renewing our alliances and forging new partnerships.The most preposterous statement in the speech. This President has screwed the pooch with respect to just about every ally we have. He has dissed the French, insulted and ignored the British and Germans. He shocked the Poles and the Czechs. He is at a 4% approval rating in Israel. He has impressed the Saudis and Egyptians as a puffed up naïf. He pissed off the Indians by ignoring them when he was in Asia, and he pissed off the Japanese by fawning on the Chinese. He even pissed off the Colombians by accepting an anti-American tirade in the form of a book from Hugo Chavez at UNGA. Does he realize any of this? Doesn’t seem so. And we have forged a new beginning between America and the Muslim WorldTotal wishful thinking, and new polling data shows it.—one that recognizes our mutual interest in breaking a cycle of conflict, and that promises a future in which those who kill innocents are isolated by those who stand up for peace and prosperity and human dignity.

Finally, we must draw on the strength of our values—for the challenges that we face may have changed, but the things that we believe in must not. That is why we must promote our values by living them at home—which is why I have prohibited tortureAs if predecessors explicitly authorized it, which is nonsense. and will close the prison at Guantanamo Bay.Which turns out to be lots harder than you thought, huh? And we must make it clear to every man, woman and child around the world who lives under the dark cloud of tyranny that America will speak out on behalf of their human rights, and tend to the light of freedom, and justice, and opportunity, and respect for the dignity of all peoples. That is who we are. That is the moral source of America’s authority.Many note that the “d” word is absent. I applaud that; others do not. Too long a discussion to go into here.

Since the days of Franklin Roosevelt, and the service and sacrifice of our grandparents, our country has borne a special burden in global affairs. We have spilled American blood in many countries on multiple continents. We have spent our revenue to help others rebuild from rubble and develop their own economies. We have joined with others to develop an architecture of institutions—from the United Nations to NATO to the World Bank—that provide for the common security and prosperity ofOK, this is the trans-Afghanistan coda to the speech now started, which lifts the speech into the realm of sacred narrative, which is where a speech like this needs to be lifted. And it’s done brilliantly. human beings“of all peoples” would have been lots better than “of human beings.”.

We have not always been thanked for these efforts, and we have at times made mistakes. But more than any other nation, the United States of America has underwritten global security for over six decades—a time that, for all its problems, has seen walls come down, markets open, billions lifted from poverty, unparalleled scientific progress, and advancing frontiers of human liberty.A+

For unlike the great powers of old, we have not sought world domination. Our union was founded in resistance to oppression. We do not seek to occupy other nations. We will not claim another nation’s resources or target other peoples because their faith or ethnicity is different from ours. What we have fought for—and what we continue to fight for—is a better future for our children and grandchildren, and we believe that their lives will be better if other peoples’ children and grandchildren can live in freedom and access opportunity.A+; really fine stuff. Except I don’t like the use of access as an intransitive verb.

As a country, we are not as young—and perhaps not as innocent—as we were when Roosevelt was President. Yet we are still heirs to a noble struggle for freedom. Now we must summon all of our might and moral suasion to meet the challenges of a new age. Really on a great roll.

In the end, our security and leadership does not come solely from the strength of our arms. It derives from our people—from the workers and businesses who will rebuild our economy; from the entrepreneurs and researchers who will pioneer new industries; from the teachers that will educate our children, and the service of those who work in our communities at home; from the diplomats and Bulls-eye. Peace Corps volunteers who spread hope abroad; Cheap applause line; the Peace Corp budget is less than that of our military bands, and Obama has not changed that. and from the men and women in uniform who are part of an unbroken line of sacrifice that has made government of the people, by the people, and for the people a reality on this Earth.Bulls-eye.

This vast and diverse citizenry will not always agree on every issue—nor should we. But I also know that we, as a country, cannot sustain our leadership nor navigate the momentous challenges of our time if we allow ourselves to be split asunder by the same rancor and cynicism and partisanship that has in recent times poisoned our national discourse.

It is easy to forget that when this war began, we were united—bound together by the fresh memory of a horrific attack, and by the determination to defend our homeland and the values we hold dear. I refuse to accept the notion that we cannot summon that unity again. I believe with every fiber of my being that we—as Americans—can still come together behind a common purpose. For our values are not simply words written into parchment—they are a creed that calls us together, and that has carried us through the darkest of storms as one nation, one people.Absolutely superb; some of the best Presidential rhetoric in decades—especially the last sentence.

America—we are passing through a time of great trial. And the message that we send in the midst of these stormsNot sure if the repetition of the word storms works here. must be clear: that our cause is just, our resolve unwavering. We will go forward with the confidence that right makes might, and with the commitment to forge an America that is safer, a world that is more secure, and a future that represents not the deepest of fears but the highest of hopes.Great stuff—fantastic, wonderful sentence. Thank you, God BlessCapital “B”? you, God Bless our troops, and may God Bless the United States of America.

I think that setting a date for the beginning of a withdrawal actually sends a good signal, but to very different audiences than either the Taliban on the one hand, or to dovish Americans on the other.  The two most important targets are the US commanders on the ground, and the Afghan government.

The whole problem with the US approach to counterinsurgency, not just in Afghanistan but stretching all the way back to Vietnam and before, was the fact that the US has never sufficiently emphasized training indigenous forces as the core of what they are to do in a military intervention.  There are a number of reasons for this, most importantly the fact that no US commander will ever want to fight an enemy with poorly trained and resourced indigenous forces when he could use American troops.  But in the end, no counterinsurgency war will ever be won with foreign forces taking the lead. Nor will there ever be an exit for the US from the conflict other than humiliating defeat unless there is an indigenous government and army to eventually carry the burden.

One of the reasons that we are in our current Afghan pickle is the fact that we never invested enough in training high quality Afghan forces from the moment we toppled the regime in Kabul back in 2001.  The Afghan National Army (ANA) is by all accounts reasonably well trained, but is ridiculously small in comparison to the job they must shoulder.  The police on the other hand have been a disaster from the beginning.  Police training was first delegated to the Germans, and then to contractors like Dyncorp, and greatly under-resourced.   Most Afghans run the other way when they see a policeman coming, such is their reputation for corruption and brutality.  We now have commanders in the theater who understand the importance of training, but they will still have incentives to rely on American forces if the latter are readily available.

Setting a timetable for the withdrawal of US forces puts both US commanders and the Afghan government under the gun (so to speak) to get sufficient indigenous forces in place to fill in behind departing US troops.  It will also motivate them to get very creative in persuading as many Pushtun tribesmen as possible to switch sides, or to at least cease supporting the Taliban.  The Afghan government has been less than serious about shouldering its part of the burden as well, because it has been able to take US backing for granted.

During the civil war in El Salvador during the 1980s, the Democrats in Congress put very sharp ceilings on the number of active duty US service personnel who could serve there—some 57 in total, if my memory serves.  I remember being outraged at the time that Congress was meddling to this degree and depriving US commanders of what they thought was necessary to fight the war.  But in the end it proved to be a very good move.  The low ceiling on American combat forces compelled the commanders there to get fully serious about training and equipping the Salvadorian army, who in any event had better local knowledge who and what they were fighting.  The army reversed the tide and put the FMLN under heavy pressure, which then paved the way for the eventual accord that ended the war.

In this respect the added 30,000 troops now going to Afghanistan could prove to be a real trap, if they are seen as anything other than a temporary bridge while we build indigenous capacity and make the appropriate political deals.  It is not clear whether this will work, but we will have a better idea in a couple of years.  If it doesn’t, then we will need to figure out how to make an exit in any event.

Anyone who thinks that the Taliban are now suddenly encouraged by the administration’s announcement of a timetable needs to engage in a little reality check.  The American public is simply not going to support a large, open-ended commitment to fight in Afghanistan.  So we are either bluffing or kidding ourselves if we say today that we will bear any burden in this fight.  Our interests there are simply not great enough to merit that.  It is true that Afghans will not side with us if they know in advance we are leaving.  But what is much worse is pretending to them that we will stick it out over the long haul, and then leaving anyway because we actually didn’t mean it.  In the history of our foreign policy we have unfortunately made these kinds of hollow promises far too often.

I doubt that the Obama administration has justified its strategy to itself in the terms I just laid out.  Among other reasons is the fact that they continue to set an unreasonably low limit on how many indigenous ANA forces they intend to train and equip.  My main hope is that they will stumble upon the right strategy by the logic of events.  The process has not looked pretty up to this point, but that does not preclude the possibility of a good outcome.

The point is that this sort of public disagreement—arguably worse than “dithering” but likely to contribute to it—was bound to happen thanks to the way in which the decision structure over the Afghanistan/Pakistan portfolio was peopled in the first place: Too many Chiefs, not enough Indians. I wrote about this in my blog, The Newest Dealer, on February 9, and warned about the consequences. Since no one reads my blog—true enough, I don’t make it particularly easy to read it—I thought I’d quote a bit from what I wrote a little more than nine months ago. As you’ll see, I predicted a train wreck if the lines of authority over this policy area were not sorted out carefully and clearly.  Oh, it’s so much fun to be able to say, “See, I told you so!”  I just wish it were possible these days to predict good outcomes as often as bad ones.

In Sunday’s Washington Post (Feb. 8, 2009), front page on the right above the fold–in other words, the Post‘s Sunday lead–there appeared an article by Karen DeYoung entitled “Obama’s NSC Will Get New Power.” You can read what General Jim Jones has in store, evidently with the President’s approval, for yourself. What you can’t read in the Washington Post is about where these ideas came from. They came, in the main, from a two-year Congressionally funded commission called the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR). . . .

We’ll see how this new NSC design works out. . . but one thing is already clear: The transition to a stronger, more authoritative NSC is not likely to be a smooth one. The system in transition has already scored one doozy of a boner.

Jones apparently offered General Tony Zinni the post of U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, replacing Ambassador Crocker who is leaving real soon. Possibly seeing this as a power grab, Secretary Hillary scotched the notion, apparently arguing that it wasn’t a good idea to have military guys in both Baghdad and Kabul (General Karl Eikenberry, a 3-star, is headed there). So Chris Hill got that job instead–Chris Hill of the Six-Power Talks negotiations. . . .

Anyway, this was pretty embarrassing, obviously. Jones then reportedly apologized to Zinni for the mix-up and asked him if he’d wanted to be our man in Riyadh instead.  Zinni, again reportedly (heck, I certainly wasn’t there), general to general, Marine to Marine, told Jones where he could shove that job. Boy, isn’t gossip fun, especially when it has that strong, musky odor of verisimilitude about it?

You can see why Hillary Clinton felt as she did, assuming she did and this was not just an innocent start-of-administration communications mix-up. The Arab-Israeli portfolio has been rented out to George Mitchell, the Afghan-Pak portfolio to Richard Holbrooke. Vice-President Biden has staked a claim to policy on Russia and NATO. What does she get to do? Stare down Hugo Chávez?

But maybe she’s lucky. Look what these folks have drummed up for Afghanistan alone. You’ve got a 4-star in Washington at Centcom, General Petreaus, with overall authority on the security side. You’ve got another 4-star in the field there, Gen. McKiernan. You’ve got a 3-star soon in the Embassy, Gen. Eikenberry. You’ve got Richard Holbrooke as special representative of the President. You’ve got the lurking Joseph Biden, who has taken a special interest in Afghanistan for some time, and one of his longtime aides, Tony Blinken, in a hot seat with a joystick at the NSC. Someone down there is the Assistant Secretary of State for Central Asia, too, presently Richard Boucher but probably not for long. Secretary Gates? He counts also. And so the question: Who the hell is in charge?!  Beats me. Hillary is wise to stay out of the way until this gets sorted out…..if it ever does get sorted out.